As a whole, these models argue the inadequacy of the modern evolutionary synthesis on the roles of genes and natural selection as the principal explanation of living structures.
In short, developmental systems theory intends to formulate a perspective which does not presume the causal (or ontological) priority of any particular entity and thereby maintains an explanatory openness on all empirical fronts.
Developmental systems theory, by contrast, assumes that the process/data distinction is at best misleading and at worst completely false, and that while it may be helpful for very specific pragmatic or theoretical reasons to treat a structure now as a process and now as a datum, there is always a risk (to which reductionists routinely succumb) that this methodological convenience will be promoted into an ontological conclusion.
As a result, much of the conceptual framework that justifies ‘selfish gene’ models is regarded by developmental systems theory as not merely weak but actually false.
[11] Likewise, the wholly generic, functional and anti-developmental models offered by information processing theory are comprehensively challenged by DST’s evidence that nothing is explained without an explicit structural and developmental analysis on the appropriate levels.
[12] Philosopher Neven Sesardić, while not dismissive of developmental systems theory, argues that its proponents forget that the role between levels of interaction is ultimately an empirical issue, which cannot be settled by a priori speculation; Sesardić observes that while the emergence of lung cancer is a highly complicated process involving the combined action of many factors and interactions, it is not unreasonable to believe that smoking has an effect on developing lung cancer.
Therefore, though developmental processes are highly interactive, context dependent, and extremely complex, it is incorrect to conclude main effects of heredity and environment are unlikely to be found in the "messiness".
[13] Hereditarian Psychologist Linda Gottfredson differentiates the "fallacy of so–called "interactionism"" from the technical use of gene-environment interaction to denote a non–additive environmental effect conditioned upon genotype.
[17] Similarly, Steven Pinker argues if genes and environment couldn't actually be separated then speakers have a deterministic genetic disposition to learn a specific native language upon exposure.