By the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of September 22, 1941, they were ordered to create a stable defense and allocate reserves.

Fulfilling these requirements, virtually all the armies of the front carried out private offensive operations at the end of September, with very limited or no success, but with significant losses.

The German command planned to deliver the main deep dissecting blow with the forces of the 1st Tank Group from the area north of Dnepropetrovsk in the direction of the Azov Sea (to the city of Osipenko).

[2] Soviet intelligence was unable to establish the concentration of the 1st Tank Group in this sector, so the blow of this entire armada fell on the positions of two rifle divisions, staffed after previous battles by less than 50% personnel and practically without artillery.

[6] However, Erich von Manstein, a direct participant in those events, indicated less data in his memoirs: "We captured 65 thousand prisoners, 125 tanks and over 500 guns in a round–robin manner".

[7] On October 5, the commander of the troops of the Southern Front, Dmitry Ryabyshev, and a member of the Military Council, Alexander Zaporozhets, were removed from their posts.

The 1st German Panzer Army was immediately redirected to the Rostov Direction and by the end of October 13 had reached the Taganrog Region.

There, on October 11, the Soviet command hastily created the Taganrog task force consisting of 3 rifle and 3 cavalry divisions, two military schools and a regiment of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Commander Lieutenant General Fyodor Remezov), which in heavy battles managed to hold back the German offensive.

By the beginning of November, the troops of the right wing of the Southern Front (12th Army), by order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, withdrew to the Krasny Liman, Debaltsevo line, and the troops of its left wing (18th and 9th Armies), under pressure from superior German forces, to the line Debaltsevo – Krasny Luch – Bolshekrepinskaya – Khapry, where they took up defensive positions.

The German command wanted to make the most of the results achieved: while the hastily created defense of the Soviet troops as a whole was weak, after a short regrouping and pulling up the rear there was a chance to resume a successful offensive.

At the same time, having met stubborn resistance on the shortest route to Rostov–on–Don (via Taganrog), von Rundstedt decided to transfer the 1st Panzer Army to the north and strike a deep sweeping blow to Rostov through Dyakovo – Shakhty – Novocherkassk.

At the same time, he planned not only to capture Rostov–on–Don, but also to encircle and destroy parts of the 9th and 56th Separate Armies of Lieutenant General Fyodor Remezov (was transferred from the North Caucasus and hastily took up defenses around Rostov–on–Don).

German tanks slowly "gnawed" the Soviet defenses, significant air forces were striking at them, and strong counterattacks were launched on the enemy's flanks on October 6 and 7.

In this situation, Rundstetd ordered Kleist to abandon the deep bypass of Rostov and attack the city from the north, through Kuteinikovo – Bolshiye Saly, transferring a blow to the defense zone of the 56th Soviet Army.

At the initial stage of the operation, in early October 1941, the Soviet troops of the Southern Front suffered a crushing defeat with heavy losses.

A particularly positive role at this stage was played by the massing of Soviet artillery and aviation forces in tank–hazardous areas and the creation of a unified anti–tank defense.