With the Battle of Kursk raging to the north, and significant reserves pulled from both 1st Panzer and Sixth Armies to allow for such a grand offensive, the German situation in the Donbas area was not particularly solid.

[3] The troops that manned this sector of the front were not as well-equipped as their northern counterparts, and some Luftwaffe field divisions were included in the order of battle for Sixth and First Panzer Armies.

A previous Soviet offensive in the area had been beaten back with the assistance of SS and regular Panzer divisions, but these had since been removed to address more pressing matters to the north; in particular the battles surrounding Kharkov.

[4] Therefore, on the 16th of August, when the Red Army struck, the German forces in this area would be hard pressed to hold the line without the assistance of either the river Donets or strong armored support to push back the Soviet onslaught.

The main concern from Southern Front's commander, FI Tolbuchin, was the relative weakness of his units after July's failed attacks.

Despite this apparent opportunity to reform the line, and withdraw west at best speed, General Hollidt was unable to secure approval, with dire consequences for the XXIX Corps.

Desperate fighting was had all across the front, but men of the 2nd Guards and 5th Shock armies forced their way forward, threatening to encircle XXIX Corps.

After the fall of Stalino, Manstein was forced to continue his retreat to the Dnieper river, all the while under heavy pressure from Soviet tank and mechanized units.

[8] As a result of the Soviet victory, the German Army had been forced to rapidly fall back more than 300 kilometers to the Panther–Wotan line along the Dnieper, which was still under construction.