Dulles–Jackson–Correa Report

The report focused primarily on the coordination and organization of the CIA and offered suggestions that refined the US intelligence effort in the early stages of the Cold War.

The CIA was not to be part of the military command structure, nor was it to have a domestic role or police power and was to be under the control of the newly established position of Director of Central Intelligence.

Although Admiral James Forrestal and the Navy were originally opposed to having a unified Department of Defense, integration allowed for top-level coordination efforts between all three branches and provided a continuing voice for the military as the Secretaries of the three military branches were permanent members on the National Security Council.

Congress passed the first investigation, the First Hoover Commission, unanimously while the second, the Dulles–Jackson–Correa Report, was conducted through the NSC per President Truman's request.

[4] Former President Herbert Hoover was chairman of the 12-member bipartisan Congressional Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch, which was established prior to the passage of the National Security Act of 1947.

[4] As part of the commission, the Task Force on National Security Organization (led by Ferdinand Eberstadt) examined the effectiveness of the intelligence agencies and reviewed federal bureaucracy.

With the realization that intelligence would serve as the first line of defense,[8] the NSC thought it was necessary that the newly formed CIA's performance was as efficient as possible.

[8] In essence, the Dulles Report was accusing Hillenkoetter of not effectively coordinating intelligence efforts among agencies and departments with national security interests.

In particular, internal security, high turnover rates of employees, and a large number of military personnel were of concern.

[4] The Dulles Report suggested that the DCI should be of a civilian status and that military personnel should resign their positions in order to add to continuity and to maintain independence from other agencies The implementation of the Dulles–Jackson–Correa Report recommendations began in the late 1950s after President Truman forced DCI Hillenkoetter to resign due to the latter's failure to foresee the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950.