Eberstadt Report

In 1945, both President Harry Truman and the Joint Chief of Staff believed the national defense and intelligence capabilities of the U.S. needed to be reorganized quickly.

[5] The Commission’s purpose was to examine the organization and operations of various arms of the executive branch of the US government and make appropriate recommendations for improvement through various task forces.

[7][8] From June 1948 through January 1949, Eberstadt’s task force examined the workings of the country’s entire national security and intelligence system, including extensive research on the US Department of Defense.

Specifically, it cited the poor relationship of the CIA to G-2 of the US Army, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Atomic Energy Commission, and the US State Department.

[16] It recommended the CIA create “within the agency at the top echelon an evaluation board or section composed of competent and experienced personnel who would have no administrative responsibilities and whose duties would be confined solely to intelligence evaluation.” [17] Eberstadt's task force felt this was necessary because the highest administrators within the CIA had little time to evaluate intelligence.

[18] Believing responsibility for covert activities should fall under one entity, the Eberstadt Report stated the CIA, under supervision of the National Security Council, should lead such operations, unless in time of war.

[21] The report also noted the CIA suffered from high numbers of inadequately trained and inexperienced personnel caused by quick expansion after its creation.

[22] In the debate over who should become the DCI, the report recommended a civilian hold the position in order to bring “a broader background and greater versatility and diplomatic experience than is usually found in service personnel.”[23] The report also supported a Congressional bill that would have set into law the procedures that maintained the secrecy of the intelligence budget process, specifically that of the CIA.

These recommendations were deemed necessary due to bureaucratic restraints which prevented the Scientific Branch of the CIA from effectively executing its function.

Ferdinand Eberstadt