However different they may be in other respects, all these views agree in making matter consist essentially of simple and indivisible units, substances, or forces.
The major thesis for Leibniz follows as a consequences of his monad, that: “the nature of every substance carries a general expression of the whole universe.
[3] In the opening paragraph of Specimen dynamicum (1692), Leibniz begins by clarifying his intention to supersede the Cartesian account of corporeal substance by asserting the priority of force over extension...
By superseding the Cartesian concept of corporeal substance and by advocating the Aristotelian principle of form, Leibniz sets the stage for an interpretation of material being in terms different from those of inert matter and externally communicated motion.
In effect, Leibniz’s theory of force involves the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the matter-form composite as the pivotal concept of the metaphysics of corporeal nature.
Leibniz’s concern to revive the Aristotelian explanatory scheme by means of the concept of substantial force underlies his description of the structural and material features of the aggregation of monads and corporeal interaction.