Energy policy of Russia
Russia is the world's leading net energy exporter, and was a major supplier to the European Union until the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
[2][3] In July 2008, Russia's president signed a law allowing the government to allocate strategic oil and gas deposits on the continental shelf without an auction procedure.
As a great deal of Russia's gas is exported to Europe through the pipelines crossing Ukraine, those disputes affected several other European countries as well.
[14] The economy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was based on a system of state ownership of the means of production, collective farming, industrial manufacturing and centralized administrative planning.
The Soviet Union invested heavily into infrastructure projects including the electrification of vast areas, and the construction and maintenance of natural gas and oil pipelines that stretch out of Russia and into every constituent nations of the USSR.
[22] Russia has used Central Asia's gas, primarily that from Turkmenistan, on occasions where it has found itself unable to meet all its delivery obligations from its own production.
Recent developments such as Yen-Yakhinskoe, Yuzhno-Russkoye and West Pestsovoe in the Nadym-Pur-Taz area, which have all come on-stream since 2005, are relatively cost-efficient, being located close to the existing pipeline grid and other infrastructure.
[27][23] Investments in the development of Shtokman and Yamal are forecast to account for over 40% of Gazprom's total expected capital expenditure over the next 20 years.
In September 2009, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said Russia would try to liberalize the domestic gas market in the near future but would maintain Gazprom's export monopoly in the medium term.
[31] The Power of Siberia pipeline is designed to reduce China's dependence on coal, which is more carbon intensive and causes more pollution than natural gas.
Russia did not face mandatory cuts since its greenhouse-gas emissions fell well below the 1990 baseline due to a drop in economic output after the breakup of the Soviet Union.
[9][53] In June 2015, Russian president Vladimir Putin received deputy crown prince Mohammad bin Salman along with the Saudi minister of petroleum and mineral resources Ali al-Naimi; the latter spoke of "creating a petroleum alliance between the two countries for the benefit of the international oil market as well as producing countries and stabilizing and improving the market".
[55] In late November 2016, Russia agreed to join OPEC nations to reduce oil output, with cuts taking effect from 1 January 2017 to last for six months.
[9][56][57][58] In October 2022, OPEC+ led by Saudi Arabia announced a large cut to its oil output target, which critics say helped Russia.
[59] Robert Menendez, the Democratic chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called for a freeze on cooperation with and arms sales to Saudi Arabia, accusing the kingdom of helping Russia underwrite its war with Ukraine.
[64] After Russia's annexation of Crimea and involvement in the War in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, Western countries imposed sanctions targeting the Russian oil and gas sector.
[40] On the other hand, Russian officials like to remind their Western partners that even at the height of the Cold War the Soviet Union never disrupted energy supplies to the West.
Since 1991, the energy lever has been used for putting political or economic pressure on Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia that subsequently affected most of Europe.
[76] On 10 January, Transneft resumed oil exports through the pipeline after Belarus ended the tariff that sparked the shutdown, despite differing messages from the parties on the state of negotiations.
[79] Transneft denied any connections with radar agreement, saying that reduction was purely commercial as Tatneft and Bashneft started to refine more oil at their own refineries.
The electricity transmission line in Russia's southern region of Karachayevo-Cherkessiya near the Georgian border was brought down by an explosion just hours later.
Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili blamed Russia for putting pressure on Georgia's energy system at the time of the coldest weather.
[83] On 1 November 2006 Gazprom announced that it will construct a direct gas pipeline to Georgia's breakaway region of South Ossetia.
[84] Starting 1 January 2007 Gazprom increased natural gas prices to Georgia following an international incident in an alleged effort to strongly influence the Georgian leadership's defiance of Moscow.
The August 2008 military conflict between Georgia and Russia over the autonomous region of South Ossetia, which has been de facto independent from Georgia since the early 1990s, is likely to shift the balance of power between the main players involved in the formation of the future of the Caspian and Central Asian energy sector, including: The volatility of these transit routes is likely to shape investment decisions of international oil companies involved in the development of Central Asian and Caspian hydrocarbons and their transportation to global markets.
Governments of these resource-rich countries are bound to have serious concerns about the safety of BTC, WREP and BTE pipelines, the railway networks and the oil terminals at the Georgian Black Sea ports of Batumi, Kulevi and Poti, all of which were halted by the Georgian-Russian hostilities.
Despite attempts to relieve tensions, consecutive Polish governments strongly oppose the Nord Stream project bypassing Poland and favour further development of overland alternatives.
The two parties were unable to reach an agreement to resolve the dispute, and Russia cut gas exports to Ukraine on 1 January 2006 at 10:00 MSK.
François Lamoureux, Director general for Energy and Transport at the European Commission and Viktor Khristenko, Vice-Prime Minister of the Russian Federation took up the responsibility as sole interlocutors.
The main issue remain open is how, and to what extent, the Protocol will include mechanisms for establishment long term transit arrangements.
