Exegesis
One of the early examples of exegesis, and one of the larger corpora of text commentaries from the ancient world, comes from Mesopotamia (modern-day Iraq) in the first millennium BCE.
[5] In the 3rd century, the theologian Origen, a graduate of Catechetical School of Alexandria, formulated the principle of the three senses of Scripture (literal, moral and spiritual) from the Jewish method of interpretation (midrash) used by Paul of Tarsus in Epistle to the Galatians chapter 4.
[7] It is the primary method of interpretation for many conservative Protestant exegetes who reject the historical-critical method to various degrees (from the complete rejection of historical criticism of some fundamentalist Protestants to the moderated acceptance of it in the Catholic Church since Pope Pius XII),[8] in contrast to the overwhelming reliance on historical-critical interpretation, often to the exclusion of all other hermeneutics, in liberal Christianity.
In this view of exegesis, the principle of sensus plenior applies—that because of its divine authorship, the Bible has a "fuller meaning" than its human authors intended or could have foreseen.
The Midrash is a compilation of homiletic teachings or commentaries on the Tanakh (Hebrew Bible), a biblical exegesis of the Pentateuch and its paragraphs related to the Law or Torah, which also forms an object of analysis.
In the halakhic as well as in the aggadic exegesis, the expounder endeavored not so much to seek the original meaning of the text as to find authority in a Hebrew Bible passage for established concepts and ideas, rules of conduct, and teachings, for which he wished to locate a foundation.
Midrash exegesis was largely in the nature of homiletics, expounding the Bible not primarily in order to understand the documents of the past (although in some instances it is indeed the case), but to find religious edification, moral instruction, and sustenance for the thoughts and feelings of the present.
The Babylonian Amoraim were the first to use the expression "Peshaṭ" ("simple" or face value method) to designate the primary sense, contrasting it with the "Drash," the Midrashic exegesis.
The intelligent reading and comprehension of the text, arrived at by a correct division of the sentences and words, formed the course of instruction in the Hebrew Bible.
The reading of the biblical text, which was combined with that of the Targum, served to widen the knowledge of the scholars learned in the first division of the national science.
Jewish exegesis did not finish with the redaction of the Talmud, but continued during ancient times, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance; it remains a subject of study today.
Jews have centers for exegetic studies around the world, in each community: they consider exegesis an important tool for the understanding of scripture.
Associated with the rabbinic text studies, such methodology is known to adopt a wide assortment of literary tools, in conjunction with meticulous, widespread engagement with classical exegetical literature.
Throughout history, exegetes like Saadia Gaon (The Book of Beliefs and Opinions), Avicebron, and Isaac Alfasi have bridged gaps between different eras and emphasized empirical observation, logic, and divine attributes.
Zoroastrian exegesis differs from similar phenomena in many other religions in that it developed as part of a religious tradition which made little or no use of writing until well into the Sasanian era.
This lengthy period of oral transmission has clearly helped to give the Middle Persian Zand its characteristic shape and has, in a sense, limited its scope.
At Australian and British universities, the exegesis forms part of the required work for fine arts, including creative-writing doctorates.
[23] In the late 1930s, Leo Strauss called for the first time for a reconsideration of the "distinction between exoteric (or public) and esoteric (or secret) teaching.
Insofar as it questions conventional wisdom at its roots, philosophy must guard itself especially against those readers who believe themselves authoritative, wise, and liberal defenders of the status quo.
This was especially apparent in medieval times when heterodox political thinkers wrote under the threat of the Inquisition or comparably obtuse tribunals.
Strauss's argument is not that the medieval writers he studies reserved one exoteric meaning for the many (hoi polloi) and an esoteric, hidden one for the few (hoi oligoi), but that, through rhetorical stratagems including self-contradiction and hyperboles, these writers succeeded in conveying their proper meaning at the tacit heart of their writings—a heart or message irreducible to "the letter" or historical dimension of texts.
It was precisely these righteous personalities who would be most inclined to persecute/ostracize anyone who was in the business of exposing the noble or great lie upon which the authority of the few over the many stands or falls.
