This paper examines the separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government under the proposed United States Constitution due to the confusion of the concept at the citizen level.

47, Madison attempted to refute critics who feared that the Constitution would not sufficiently protect the separation of powers among the executive, judiciary, and legislature.

Madison acknowledged that separation of powers was "one of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to the Constitution" and that "no political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value."

He also stated that "the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.

He explained how the monarch (executive branch) cannot pass a law solely, but has the power of veto, can create foreign sovereigns, and that he/she cannot administer justice, but appoints those who do.

He expressed how the legislature can do no judiciary act, but can remove judges upon agreement from both houses, can do no executive actions, but constitutes the magistracy and has the power of impeachment.

"Diversifying the voices heard in government not only helps to prevent one point of view from becoming too strong, but also promotes the affirmative goal of democratizing governmental decision-making."

Madison took a different perspective regarding separation of powers at this point in the paper and considers them as more a system of "checks and balances" as he addresses the states' constitutions.

Massachusetts's constitution agreed with Montesquieu on the separation of powers as it did not state a clear disconnect between the three branches but contained partial agencies.