This battle represented the first time that Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) had coordinated attacks from different divisions, and was intended as "rehearsal" to experiment with urban-fighting techniques to be used for the Tet Offensive.

[2] Operational goals of COSVN was in part, to draw US and ARVN forces away from the cities in an upsurge of activity, in preparation for the Tet Offensive the next year.

[3] As a part of his strategic preparations for the Tet Offensive in early 1968, General Võ Nguyên Giáp began attacking isolated allied bases in the fall of 1967 in hopes he could draw US and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces outside of several major South Vietnamese cities.

Allied intelligence also obtained documents indicating that the VC 9th Division would begin a major operation in Bình Long Province on or about 25 October.

At 02:00, VC sappers attacked the district headquarters detonating satchel charges on the northern perimeter wire clearing the way for two battalions of the 273rd Regiment.

Despite this air support, the situation in the compound remained desperate and the district chief called for a proximity fuse artillery barrage on his own position which caused devastating losses to the exposed VC.

At dawn, the ARVN found that some VC had stayed behind in bunkers in the compound, and after reinforcements arrived they proceeded to methodically clear them out using M72 LAW rockets.

By 09:50, the battery was operational and conducting preparatory fire for the landing of the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment 3.5 kilometers (2.2 mi) to the northwest near the hamlet of Srok Silamite.

[5]: 55–6 Hay ordered the 1st Brigade to move its headquarters to Quần Lợi Base Camp to prepare for a renewed attack on Loc Ninh.

Just after midnight on 31 October, rockets and mortar shells began pounding the district compound, the Special Forces camp, and the airstrip artillery firebase.

A small group of VC made it across the airstrip and fought their way into the district headquarters compound, however as no follow-up troops were able to advance they soon abandoned their attack and withdrew.

At dawn, the 1/18th policed the perimeter finding 263 VC dead while drag marks and blood trails suggested their losses were even higher.

[5]: 60–1 On the morning of 7 November, with Company A remaining to guard their firebase, the rest of 1/26 Infantry left to patrol a dirt road bordered by a rubber plantation.

Dobbins assumed temporary command of the battalion, calling in air and artillery strikes to cover the unit as it withdrew to a more defensible position.