This diverted their attention from the north, where the real Hungarian attack was to start with I, III and VII Corps moving west along the northern bank of the Danube to Komárom, to relieve it from the imperial siege.

[4] Although the president of the National Defense Committee (interim government of Hungary), Lajos Kossuth went to the Hungarian headquarters at Gödöllő, after the battle of Isaszeg and wanted a direct attack on Pest, he was finally convinced by Görgey that his and the other generals' plan was better.

[5] After the Battle of Isaszeg, Field Marshal Windisch-Grätz ordered the division quartered in Balassagyarmat to defend the Ipoly valley, led by Lieutenant General Georg von Ramberg, to move to Vác, to secure the Danube Bend from a Hungarian attack.

But at the same time he made the mistake of ordering Lieutenant General Anton Csorich, who actually was defending Vác with his division, to move to Pest.

And indeed Windisch-Grätz ordered a general advance of his I and III Corps, to learn whether the Hungarian main army was in front of Pest or had moved northwards.

[6] At the same time, the deceptive maneuvers by Aulich and Asbóth managed to attract the attention of the imperials, who did not notice the march of III Corps, led by János Damjanich.

[6] Aulich and Asbóth's troops did their job of making the imperials believe that the main Hungarian army was still in front of the capital so well that neither Windisch-Grätz until his dismissal, nor Lieutenant Field Marshal Josip Jelačić (interim commander until the arrival of Feldzeugmeister Ludwig von Welden who was named as the new commander-in-chief), dared to do anything.

[11] The military historian Róbert Hermann, writing 20 years later (2004) states that only Bobich's brigade accompanied III Corps towards Vác.

[7] Sensing that the Hungarian attack is imminent, the high commander also ordered him to send quickly his sick soldiers and the army's luggage to Esztergom.

[10] Götz's men had not fought since the middle of February, being kept busy moving hither and thither in northern Hungary, in this aspect the battle-hardened Hungarian troops had the advantage.

On a rainy 10 April, Damjanich positioned his troops south from Vác around 9 o'clock, after moving along the Pest-Vác road, because on that morning the fields were impassable due to wet weather.

[18] The 4. battalion of the 15. infantry regiment, under Colonel Strasdil was positioned on the Calvary hill (Kálváriadomb), in order to protect Vác from an eventual attack from East.

In the meanwhile Götz realized that he faced a numerically superior army, and at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, decided to start his retreat from the town.

[20] Unaware of the fact that the Bobich brigade lost its way, around 3 p.m. Damjanich was still waiting for the signal from them (a cannon shot), showing that they reached the Naszály mountain behind Vác, in order to start the attack.

[21] In the same time his troops, which waited for four hours in the pouring rain, started to run out of patience, as well as Damjanich, who finally ordered Wysocki's Polish Legion to charge the bridge, while his artillery fired incessantly.

[22] Because the retreat of Jablonowski's brigade, the Austrian cannons stopped to fire for a while, which made the Hungarian artillerymen to realize the enemies real intentions, so they concentrated their shootings on the stone bridge.

At that moment the imperial officer who was ordering the volleys was so astonished by this recklessness that he forgot to tell his soldiers to shoot, and profiting from this opportunity, the men of the 9th battalions attack, led, this time on foot,[10] by the same Földváry, and their captain Pál Kiss, and in a harsh bayonet fight, they swept away the Austrian resistance.

[10] During this street fighting the Hungarians reached the building of the military boarding school where the wounded Götz lay, defended by the Bianchi infantry regiment.

The Hungarians occupied it after heavy fighting, and found the Austrian commander inside, taking him prisoner along with many enemy soldiers.

The last units which retreated from Vác were the 12. kaiserjäger and the Bianchi battalions which resisted heroically against the Hungarian attacks in the graveyard and on the streets, but finally they had to pull back from the enormous pressure, suffering heavy losses.

[10] Colonel Strasdil's column, which had to cover, during the retreat, the Austrians from left, missed their way, joining Jablonowski's division only on 12 April at Kéménd, after a long march through Kóspallag, Márianosztra, Ipolytölgyes and Ganod.

[29] From a tactical point of view, although they had lost their commander, the imperial defeat was not heavy, and the army could retreat in good order.

[31] Damjanich was angry at the lack of exploitation of this victory, and of others before it in the Spring Campaign (Tápióbicske, Isaszeg), and he believed that the other commanders were responsible.

[30] This was because only one corps participated in the Battle of Vác, which made Windisch-Grätz think that the rest of the Hungarian army had not yet arrived in Pest.

[32] When he finally seemed to grasp what was really happening, he wanted to make a powerful attack on 14 April against the Hungarians at Pest, and then cross the Danube at Esztergom, cutting off the army which was marching towards Komárom.

But his corps commanders, General Franz Schlik and Lieutenant Field Marshal Josip Jelačić, refused to obey, so his plan, which could have caused serious problems to the Hungarian armies, was not realized.

[33] To hold back the Hungarian advance to the west towards Komárom, Windisch-Grätz, sent an order to Lieutenant General Ludwig von Wohlgemuth to stop them with the reserve corps formed from imperial troops from Vienna, Styria, Bohemia and Moravia.