[1][2][3] This argument is detailed below: Traditionally, compatibilists (defenders of the compatibility of free will and causal determinism, like A. J. Ayer, Walter Terence Stace, and Daniel Dennett) reject premise two.
Frankfurt's examples are significant because they suggest an alternative way to defend the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism, in particular by rejecting the first premise of the argument.
Anyone with a theory concerning what "could have done otherwise" means may answer this question for [themselves] by describing whatever measures [they] would regard as sufficient to guarantee that, in the relevant sense, Jones cannot do otherwise.
In that case, it seems clear, Jones will bear precisely the same moral responsibility for what he does as he would have borne if Black had not been ready to take steps to ensure that he do it.
Having presented his counterargument against the principle of alternate possibilities, Frankfurt suggests that it be revised to take into account the fallacy of the notion that coercion precludes an agent from moral responsibility.
A deterministic connection begs the question because proponents of Frankfurt-style cases are assuming the very thing that is being debated, that moral responsibility does not require alternate possibilities or the ability to do otherwise.
This is problematic for proponents of the Frankfurt-style cases because they are supposed to show a situation where an agent is morally responsible for the decision and yet is unable to truly do otherwise.
Thus, it is possible for the agent to show the correct inclination, evade the computer device, but then make the "wrong" decision.
This kind of Frankfurt-style case would fail to present a situation where an agent is morally responsible while lacking alternate possibilities.
[10] These other arguments are supposed to show that causal determinism in and of itself and apart from ruling out alternate possibilities does not threaten moral responsibility.
This revision consists in creating a case with an explicit indeterministic connection where the agent is still morally responsible without any alternate possibilities.