Incompatibilism
[10] The number of philosophers who reject the classical assumption of anthropocentric possibilism, i.e. the view that it is at least metaphysically possible for a human to exercise free will, has also risen in recent years.
[24][16][25] Arguments in the last category conclude that people lack free will when determinism is true but not at all because determinism is true (i.e. not at all because certain causal/nomological factors obtain); most propose that the real threat to free will is that people lack adequate control over their own constitutive properties, or what is often called their "constitutive luck" (as opposed to causal luck).
[31][32][33] Critics maintain that Kane fails to overcome the greatest challenge to such an endeavor: "the argument from luck".
[34] Namely, if a critical moral choice is a matter of luck (indeterminate quantum fluctuations), then the question of holding a person responsible for their final action arises.
Kane objects to the validity of the argument from luck because the latter misrepresents the chance as if it is external to the act of choosing.
[38]: 10-11 Such philosophical stance risks an infinite regress, however;[39][40]: 7 if any such mind is real, an objection can be raised that free will would be impossible if the choosing is shaped merely by luck or chance.
One famous proponent of this view was Lucretius, who asserted that the free will arises[42]: 51 out of the random, chaotic movements of atoms, called "clinamen".
[44] A major problem for naturalistic libertarianism is to explain how indeterminism can be compatible with rationality and with appropriate connections between an individual's beliefs, desires, general character and actions.
Determinists sometimes assert that it is stubborn to resist scientifically motivated determinism on purely intuitive grounds about one's own sense of freedom.
They reason that the history of the development of science suggests that determinism is the logical method in which reality works.
[48]: 153 Absolute chance, a possible implication of quantum mechanics and the indeterminacy principle, supports the existence of indefinite causal structures.
This thesis argues in favor of maintaining the prevailing belief in free will for the sake of preserving moral responsibility and the concept of ethics.
The determinist will add that, even if denying free will does mean morality is incoherent, such a result has no effect on the truth.
A determinist's moral system simply bears in mind that every person's actions in a given situation are, in theory, predicted by the interplay of environment and upbringing.
Hard incompatibilism is a term coined by Derk Pereboom to designate the view that both determinism and indeterminism are incompatible with having free will and moral responsibility.
He contends that if people's decisions were indeterministic events, their occurrence would not be in the control of the agent in the way required for such attributions of desert.
Pereboom argues that for empirical reasons it is unlikely that people are agent causes of this sort, and that as a result, it is likely that they lack free will.
