Aside from tentative probes of the attitudes of the governments of Australia and New Zealand, no effort was being made to secure combat troops for South Vietnam, but rather economic assistance, military advisers, civil affairs personnel and humanitarian aid was sought.

[2]: 4–5 The usual procedure was to have the American embassies in Europe, Asia, and Latin America discuss the subject of aid for South Vietnam with the host countries.

[2]: 9 In June 1965, the first FWMF troops arrived in South Vietnam with the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment deployed to Bien Hoa Air Base under the operational control of the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade.

[2]: 17 On 28 July 1966, the first elements of the Philippine Civic Action Group arrived in South Vietnam and were soon deployed to Tây Ninh Combat Base.

[2]: 60 From June to October 1964, Free World activities had been handled by a small staff section within the MACV J-5, Plans and Policy Directorate.

[3] Codifying earlier ad hoc arrangements, the Free World Military Assistance Office outlined command relationships between MACV, the FWMF and the South Vietnamese.

The Australians, New Zealanders, Thais and to a degree the Filipinos placed their troops under Westmoreland's operational control and that of his subordinate American tactical commanders.

Concerned about the domestic political effects of heavy casualties, for example, the Australian and New Zealand governments were reluctant to engage their soldiers in risky offensive operations and also wanted to keep them out of internationally sensitive areas such as the Cambodian border region.

There, in a province well away from Cambodia that large enemy main-force units rarely entered, the task force could protect an important highway and fight VC guerrillas.

[4]: 344–5 The South Koreans, whose troops eventually took over defense of most of the populated coastal region of II Corps, rejected any semblance of formal American operational control.

On 6 September 1965, after lengthy conferences between the South Korean commander, General Chae Myung-shin, Westmoreland and Cao Văn Viên, a new military working arrangement was signed providing for MACV logistical and intelligence support for the South Korean force, but Chae, on grounds of national sovereignty and prestige, refused to sign any document formally placing his troops under Westmoreland’s operational control.

However, the FWMF, and most notably the South Koreans, required disproportionate amounts of U.S. logistical and combat support and of MACV command and staff attention.