The Navy Command, after an abortive mutiny of its senior officers in April 1965 against Admiral Chung Tấn Cang, remained under the close scrutiny of the JGS chief, but the other three were more autonomous.

Neither directorate had any command responsibilities, and both worked closely with American planners on organization, general campaign plans, and various administrative projects.

In fact, the South Vietnamese government had no centralized intelligence system, and its information-gathering capabilities at the village and hamlet levels, where Viet Cong activity was most intense, were almost nonexistent.

When not in Saigon, they operated in multibattalion task forces, generally reinforcing local South Vietnamese units in difficulty.

[1]: 31–2 The JGS honor guard battalion and a similar unit, the Capital Security Group, had the primary function of supporting the central military and political administration.

Both units stood outside the American-supported South Vietnamese military force structure and MACV had no control over their deployment or activities.