Fukuda Doctrine
The so-called “Yoshida Doctrine” put high priority on development and aimed at peaceful expansion of Japan's economic power in foreign markets, in order to rebuild the economy and raise the living standards of the Japanese population.
Reparations settlements between Japan and Southeast Asian countries played a significant role in such environment as they served as a tool which provided a ground for rebuilding of the relations, severed by Japanese aggression during the war.
This strategy, coordinated with US Cold War policies, aimed at bringing together Japanese know-how, US capital and Southeast Asian raw materials, in order to secure strategic resources and sustain the economic growth.
As a result, Japan became determined that as the second-biggest economic power at the time, it should make international contribution to the region, setting the starting point of the vision of the Fukuda doctrine.
After the liberation of Vietnam and the fall of Kampuchea government to the communists, combined with the declining presence of American forces in Southeast Asia, ASEAN nations began to perceive their own security in terms of raising the standard living of their people.
[6] Japan's efforts to providing itself a political role in ASEAN and Indochina was dubbed a neo-realist approach, made possible by a declining United States presence and commitments in Southeast Asia.
The Prime Minister's warning in effect functioned as a switch to a ‘political role’ in ASEAN and Indochina from its conventional practice of providing economic assistance.
[2] Moreover, by forging close diplomatic ties, what Sueo Sudo calls a ‘special relationship,’ with the organization through the use of FDI, ODA and other financial aids, Japan would try to establish a greater role for itself in the development of ASEAN region.
Fukuda further implied Japan's responsibility in the region and its larger role as a world leader by acting as an informant on current developments in international issues that could directly affect member nations.
The sudden American withdrawal from Indochina left Southeast Asia vulnerable to pressure from the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China (PRC), both of which were not in the interest of Japan.
On the other hand, the Soviet Union developed a thought-control system in which it would try to coax Southeast Asian nations into thinking of Chinese diplomacy as a form of new imperialism.
The Soviet deputy foreign minister visit to ASEAN states to discuss on friendship treaties and economic aids stands as a strong proof for its determination in Southeast Asia during the 1970s.
Japan, imbibing all the happenings and changes in the power balance in Southeast Asia, feared for its position, security, and economy which, until the early 1970s, had been under the United States wing.
[2] In addition, Japan tried to assist the postwar reconstruction of the country, by providing grant of 55 million dollars to the Government of South Vietnam for the purchase of necessary Japanese equipment and materials.
It may be argued that it would have been more beneficial to Japan to have a softer stance to Vietnam and keep the channels of dialogue open, however it was not ready to assume such political role and part ways with the US.
Following the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, it undertook to provide increased economic assistance, especially to Thailand to help the country cope with the new menace from Indochina, supporting the "front line" state of the conflict.
This coincided with the assumption that Japan has achieved the third stage of the “flying geese” pattern of development - an economic model that was influential to Japanese lawmakers at the time.
As a result of this convergence of interests, Southeast Asian countries first welcomed Japanese textile industries, then electronics and vehicle-assembly businesses, contributing to the development of new economic links.
It can be argued that in a sense, Fukuda's aspirations for "heart-to-heart" relations had unexpectedly raised ASEAN's hopes for Japan's economic offers to the region.
It may be argued that the rise of anti-Japanese feelings in the 1970s and the backlash toward the rapidly increasing dependence on Japan in regards to trade, investment and assistance contributed to the formulation of the doctrine.
The country decided to project its soft power as a mean to broaden its relations beyond the economic field, further contributing to long-term stable ties with Southeast Asia.
[8] The soft power approach included various elements, such as economic influence (ODA) and socio-cultural aspects (promotion of culture, exchanges, and cooperation on different levels).
Immediately following the agreement on setting aside 1 billion yen to fund construction projects, the Diesel plant proposal was met with opposition from Indonesia which feared competition with its domestic industry.
Domestically, the Liberal Democratic Party’s electoral votes were highly dependent on the business and agricultural sectors, both of which are hostile to STABEX for reasons of competition.
The Japan-Southeast Asia friend and foe relationship can be characterized by material interests and historical antagonism caused by Japan’s imperialistic past.
The Fukuda Doctrine, as Kei Koga, a researcher of the Center for Strategic and International Studies writes in his report, Transcending the Fukuda Doctrine, “has been instrumental in defining Japan’s approach toward ASEAN’s efforts to integrate politically.” Koga further argues that the current Japan-Southeast Asian relations have developed beyond socio-cultural, economic, to include political and security dimensions, and at a point where they can help shape and direct the region.
However, the growing hostility resulting from a war with Kampuchea in 1978, and the need for outside funding for its ambitious five-year economic development plan left Vietnam little choice but to seek for financial support from Japan.
The press, in spite of being criticized for sympathizing with the Liberal Democratic Party, exercised great influence over national consensus on Japan's new role in Southeast Asia.
Amongst positive reactions to the Overseas Trade Development Association Foundation of Japan's revision, there was a growing fear that the unbridled assistance to Southeast Asian industrialization may ineluctably drive Japanese manufacturers out of the ASEAN market.
Regardless, those supporting of the doctrine argued against such thought by interpreting industrialization as the increase in standard of living which could subsequently engender higher income and more demand for Japanese products.
