Born in rural Shaanxi province in 1905, Gao Gang joined the party in 1926 and led a revolutionary guerrilla base there during the Chinese Civil War.

[4] Trusted by Mao Zedong, Gao was dramatically promoted in the final years of the civil war to become the party state and military head of Manchuria, the key Northeast area of China.

In 1952, he was ordered to Beijing to become head of the State Planning Commission of China (SPC), where he later attempted a leadership challenge against Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai.

[6] When his friend since middle school Liu Zhidan led a failed insurrection in 1928, Gao joined him in remote Northwest Shaanxi, where together they built up a guerrilla base.

Gao Gang, now an influential local party cadre in the Northeastern region, detailed in a 1950 report that the CCP shall "recon[struct] the Northeast to serve as a starting point or important base for the industrialization of the whole country" [13] Gao Gang was thus, a key contributing player in the country's economic reconstruction and general production management in the early years of the CCP regime.

[7] Gao also received significant propaganda coverage, as workers and peasants were encouraged to respond to his 'call' for increased industrial production; personal letters supporting him and salutations to his health were also published.

[14] In July 1950, shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, Gao was placed in command of the 260,000-man "Northern Frontier Guards", stationed along the border with North Korea.

[17] Despite Gao's increases in power and responsibility, sources point out that Mao orchestrated Gao's promotion to Beijing in order to reduce Zhou Enlai's authority, who Mao suspected was gaining too much influence over CCP policies and leadership alongside Chen Yun and Liu Shaoqi.Gao was also confirmed as a Politburo member, a Vice-Chairman of the Central People's Government Council, and a Vice-Chairman of the People's Revolutionary Military Council.

After transferring his military responsibilities to Peng, Zhou focused his efforts on devising China's first Five-Year Plan, with the participation of the Soviet Union.

[22] For example, while Zhou was in charge of foreign relations, Mao sent Gao Gang to receive and negotiate plans with the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, in 1953 during his arrival in November.

While sources disagree on the reason for An's creation of the list, Gao mentioned and referred to the confidential document during meetings, believing that it was Liu's ploy to leverage his own position in the party.

Deng revealed a more detailed account of Gao's "underground activities" in 1980, stating that "he tried to win me over and had formal negotiations with me in which he said that Comrade Liu Shaoqi was immature.

"[24] When Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping officially informed Mao of Gao's activities, the Chairman declared them out of order, and efforts were undertaken to address the threat to party unity.

Mao had a series of private conversations with Gao in late 1952 or early 1953 where it is believed he expressed a degree of dissatisfaction with Liu and Zhou, apparently remarking that they were too cautious in their attitude towards the pace of socialist transformation in China.

Following this, Gao approached senior party members, expressed his views regarding Liu and Zhou, and made the important point to hint that he had Mao's approval.

Rao Shushi, a military figure who had his power base in East China and was chief of the Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party, gave his support to Gao.

[27] Immediately after his conference with Rao, Gao toured the southern and eastern provinces in order to discuss his views with other military leaders, primarily Lin Biao, Peng Dehuai, and Zhu De.

Mao then entrusted Liu Shaoqi, one of the targets of Gao's brief attempt to gain power, with the organization of a plenum in February 1954 that would focus on party unity.

Many refer to the fall of Gao Gang, along with Rao Shushi, as a prime example of Mao's use of 'Character Assassination' to defeat surrounding political officials in the CCP hierarchy.

The "Gao Gang Affair" can be viewed simply as a stillborn coup attempt within the Politburo, but its significance is not that it failed to succeed or even to gather basic support.