The Court ruled, in a 5–4 decision, that because his statements were made pursuant to his position as a public employee, rather than as a private citizen, his speech had no First Amendment protection.
A meeting was subsequently held to discuss the affidavit with his superiors and officials from the sheriff's department, which Ceballos claimed became heated and accusatory of his role in handling the case.
His supervisors claimed that there was no retaliation, that the changes in his job were instead dictated by legitimate staffing concerns, and that regardless, Ceballos' memo was not constitutionally protected speech under the First Amendment.
The court struck the balance in Ceballos' favor, noting that his supervisors had "failed even to suggest disruption or inefficiency in the workings of the District Attorney's Office" as a result of the memo.
He nevertheless concluded that the Circuit should be revisited and overruled: "when public employees speak in the course of carrying out their routine, required employment obligations, they have no personal interest in the content of that speech that gives rise to a First Amendment right.
"[8] The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, ruling in a 5–4 decision delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy that the First Amendment does not prevent employees from being disciplined for expressions they make pursuant to their professional duties.
The four dissenting justices, in three dissents written by Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, and Stephen Breyer, took issue with the majority's firm line against the First Amendment ever applying to speech made within the scope of public employment, arguing instead that the government's stronger interest in this context could be accommodated by the ordinary balancing test.
Though the speech at issue concerned the subject matter of his employment, and was expressed within his office rather than publicly, the Court did not consider either fact dispositive, and noted that employees in either context may receive First Amendment protection.
The Court instead found a reason for limiting First Amendment protection to public statements made outside the scope of official duties "because that is the kind of activity engaged in by citizens who do not work for the government."
The Court finally rejected the argument raised in Justice Souter's dissent that employers could restrict the rights of employees "by creating excessively broad job descriptions."
The Court also reserved for a future decision the issue of whether its analysis would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.
Citing Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District (1979), Justice Stevens emphatically disagreed with the notion that there was a categorical difference between speech uttered by a citizen or by an employee in the course of his duties.
Stevens added that it would be senseless for the constitutional protection of same words to be contingent on whether they are uttered as part of one's job duties; additionally, it would be "perverse" for the Court to essentially create an incentive for employees to bypass their employer-specified channels of resolution and voice their concerns directly to the public.
Like Justice Stevens, Souter agreed with the majority that a government employer has an active interest in effectuating its objectives, and can take corresponding action to ensure "competence, honesty, and judgment" from its employees.
Souter noted that speech that addressed official wrongdoing may well be unprotected under existing statutory protections (e.g., the teacher in Givhan would not qualify as a whistle-blower).
In cases where the employee speaks as a citizen upon matters of public concern, the speech receives protection only if it passes the Pickering balancing test.
Like Souter, Breyer believed that the majority's holding that the First Amendment protections do not extend to public employees speaking pursuant to their official duties was too absolute.
[12] Therefore, where there are both professional and constitutional such obligations, "the need to protect the employee's speech is augmented, the need for broad government authority is likely diminished, and administrable standards are quite likely available."
Breyer added that in such cases, the Constitution requires special protection of employee speech, and the Pickering balancing test should apply.
[17] In 2014, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals circumscribed Garcetti, ruling in Demers v. Austin that the First Amendment protects faculty speech that criticizes university administrators on issues of public concern related to teaching or scholarship.