Geoje POW camp
Since there were little or no natural water resources on the island, Colonel Hartley F. Dame, the first camp commander, had to build dams and store rainwater to service the 118,000 locals, 100,000 refugees, and 150,000 prisoners.
Packing thousands of men into a small area with only barbed wire separating each compound from the next permitted a free exchange of thought and an opportunity to plan and execute mass demonstrations and riots.
[3]: 233–4 Although there were frequent instances of unrest and occasional outbreaks of resistance during the first months of the Geoje POW camp's existence, much of the early trouble could be traced to the fact that ROK guards were used extensively.
The Communists readily accepted the instruction in metalworking and soon began to produce weapons of all varieties instead of sanitation utensils, stoves, and garden tools and used these arms to gain interior control in the compounds whenever they could.
From February 1952, at the suggestion of U. Alexis Johnson (Deputy Secretary of State for East Asia), it was planned to check whether the prisoners were willing to return home, without making any specific promises to those who wanted to stay in the "free South".
Since the South Korean teams were equally determined to carry out their assignment, the 3rd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment moved in during the early hours of 18 February and took up positions in front of the compound.
[3]: 239 The fear that the story might leak out to the Chinese and North Koreans led the UN Command to release an official account placing the blame squarely on the shoulders of the Communist compound leaders.
The Department of the Army instructed UN commander General Matthew Ridgway to make it clear that only 1,500 of the inmates took part in the outbreak and that only civilian internees, not prisoners of war, were involved.
[3]: 240 On 2 April the North Korean and Chinese negotiators at Panmunjom showed their interest in finding out the exact number of prisoners that would be returned to their control if screening was carried out.
Spurred by this indication that the North Korean and Chinese might be willing to break the deadlock on voluntary repatriation, the UN Command inaugurated a new screening program on 8 April to produce a firm figure.
In view of the close connection between the enemy truce delegates and the POW camps, it was not surprising that the agitation of the North Korean and Chinese over the unfavorable implications of the UN screening should communicate itself quickly to the loyal Communist compounds.
Although the separation would mean more administrative personnel and more equipment would be required to organize and supervise the increased number of camps, Van Fleet felt that dispersal would lessen the possibility of resistance.
An energetic campaign to discredit the screening program backed by all the Communist compounds was made easier by the transfer of the chief opposition to the mainland and the alteration of the balance of power on the island.
[3]: 242 In early May, after a tour of inspection, Colonel Robert T. Chaplin, Provost marshal of the Far East Command, reported that Communist prisoners refused even to bring in their own food and supplies.
Actually, Eighth Army officers admitted freely that UN authorities could not enter the compounds, inspect sanitation, supervise medical support, or work the Communists prisoners as they desired.
Raven grabbed hold of a post until the guards rushed up and used their bayonets to force the prisoners back, but Dodd was successfully hauled inside the compound, whisked behind a row of blankets draped along the inner barbed wire fence, and hurried to a tent that was prepared for him.
The fear of a concerted attempt to break out of the compounds and the resultant casualties that both the UN and prisoners would probably suffer dominated this conversation and mirrored the first reaction of Dodd's superiors to the potential explosiveness of the situation.
Although they were generally disposed to accept his explanations and dismiss the accusations, the prisoner's trial of the commanding officer of the POW camp on criminal counts, making him defend his record, while still surrounded by heavily armed enemy troops, was without parallel in modern military history.
He directed Lieutenant colonel William J. Kernan, commanding officer of the 38th, to prepare a plan for violent entry into Compound 76, using tanks, flamethrowers, armored cars, .50-caliber multiple mounts, tear gas, riot guns, and the like, with a target date of 10:00 on 10 May.
If necessary he was willing to grant the prisoners' request for an association with equipment and communication facilities, but he reminded Colson that he had full authority to use all the force required to release Dodd and secure proper control and discipline.
He realized the propaganda value of an admission of the prisoners' charges, but Van Fleet had assured him that Colson's answer carried no implied acknowledgment of illegal or reprehensible acts.
The quick and summary punishment of the key officers involved did not solve the problem of what to do about Colson's statement or the more basic question of how to clean up the long-standing conditions in the POW camps.
Although the Washington leaders did not want to "repudiate" the letter, they told Clark to deny its validity on the grounds that it was obtained under duress and Colson had not had the authority to accept the false charges contained in the Communist demands.
Denial was not enough for the press, and on 27 May Chief of Staff of the United States Army General J. Lawton Collins gave Clark permission to issue a concise and factual release.
Hoping to forestall concerted action, the camp commander, Lieutenant colonel John Bostic, informed the prisoners on 11 May that food and water would be available only at the new quarters prepared for them.
After Compound 76 had been cleared, a tally of weapons showed 3,000 spears, 4,500 knives, 1,000 gasoline grenades, plus an undetermined number of clubs, hatchets, barbed wire flails and hammers.
One of the lessons that had to be relearned during the Geoje affair was that an army commander should not be burdened with the administration of his communications zone, since the distraction could not fail to detract from his efficiency in carrying out his primary mission—to fight the enemy.
Japanese press opinion reflected a growing suspicion that the US authorities had lost control of the screening process and permitted South Korean Government pressure to be exerted directly or indirectly against repatriation.
As General Jenkins, Army G-3, pointed out to Collins early in June: "The cumulative effect of sentiment such as that reflected above may tend to obscure the UNC principle of no forcible repatriation, and appear to make the armistice hinge on the questionable results of a discredited screening operation.
Violence, withholding food and water even if these were available elsewhere and the use of force on hospital patients were heavily scored and the reports that the ICRC submitted to Geneva were bound to evoke an unfavorable reaction in many quarters.91 Despite the fact that focus shifted from Geoje as the dispersal program brought the Communist prisoners under tighter controls, the cloud of doubt and suspicion that hovered over the Geoje episode could not help but make the task of the UN delegates at Panmunjom more complex.
