Operation Big Switch
Ceasefire talks had been going on between the North Korean, Chinese and United Nations Command (UNC) forces since 1951, with the main point of contention being the repatriation of all prisoners to their home countries, in accordance with Article 118 of the 1949 Geneva Convention.
To expedite matters Daniel suggested that each side turn over its lists of names and nationalities of the prisoners to be exchanged and that officers be appointed to discuss administrative details.
As the prisoners rode to the waiting Landing Ship, Tank for shipment to the mainland, they threw away their rations of tooth powder, soap, and cigarettes with hand-printed propaganda messages cached inside, charging the United States with "starvation, oppression and barbarous acts against the Korean people."
When the time came for the final train ride from Pusan to Munsan, many of the prisoners cut off buttons, severed the half-belts of their overcoats, and removed their shoelaces in an attempt to create the impression that they had been poorly treated.
General Clark felt that the advantages of demonstrating the good faith of the UNC and of possibly spurring the Chinese and North Koreans to increase their total of returnees outweighed the disadvantages of introducing a new figure and his superiors agreed.
[2]: 422–4 On 7 April, Nam Il submitted a revised proposal dropping the earlier requirement that the non-repatriates be transported physically to the neutral state and reduced the explaining period from six months to four.
To handle the non-repatriates, Nam suggested that a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) with five members - Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Sweden, and India be set up.
Since the Chinese and North Koreans had yielded on the most objectionable features of their first proposal, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and some of his top political and military advisors met in Washington D.C. to discuss the latest offer.
Encouraged by the spirit of compromise reflected in the 7 May plan, they agreed that it represented a significant shift in the enemy position and provided a basis for negotiating an acceptable armistice.
[2]: 425 On 12 May, Clark flew to Seoul to meet with South Korean President Syngman Rhee who opposed the armistice negotiations and wanted to continue the war until Korea was reunited.
In the light of Rhee's strong feelings and in sympathy with his position, Clark urged the Joint Chiefs of Staff to allow the UNC delegation to propose that the Korean non-repatriates be released as soon as the armistice was effective.
"[2]: 427 On 25 May, after receiving instructions from Washington, the UNC negotiators proposed that they would accept the five-nation custodial arrangement if all armed forces and operating personnel were provided by India.
The UNC would discard its insistence upon the immediate release of the Korean non-repatriates when the armistice became effective and instead would agree to turn these prisoners over to the repatriation commission for a period of 90 days.
Lastly, the UNC would agree either to turn disposition of the nonrepatriates over to a political conference with a thirty-day time limit and then release them, or alternatively let the U.N. General Assembly determine their final fate.
A message from President Eisenhower echoed Clark's charge and intimated that unless Rhee quickly agreed to accept the authority of the UNC to conclude the armistice, other arrangements would be made.
Clark would later comment "There is no doubt in my mind that one of the principal reasons—if not the one reason — for the Communist offensive was to give the ROK's a 'bloody nose,' to show them and the world that 'PUK CHIN' — Go North was easier said than done.
Clark advised that the United States was determined to sign an armistice under honorable terms and would not try to eject the communist troops from Korea by force and that the ROK Army could not fight on its own, offensively or defensively, at the present and needed time to prepare for the assumption of larger tasks.
He also gave up his objections to the transportation of Korean non-repatriates and Chinese prisoners to the demilitarized zone for the period of explanations, provided that no Indian troops were landed in Korea.
[2]: 480–4 On 22 July, the UNC proposed that communist prisoners who did not wish to return home should be turned over to the repatriation commission in the southern part of the demilitarized zone.
The North Korean draft permitted each side to use its own half of the demilitarized zone for turning over non-repatriates to the repatriation commission and for establishing the facilities required to handle the prisoners of war.
[3][4] In the early part of 1954, the Korean non-repatriates were released and the Chinese were shipped by plane and boat to Taiwan, except for some 86 who chose to go with the Custodian Force of India when they sailed for home.
