[12] The emerging global power typically enjoys a 'good war' with undamaged domestic infrastructure and a booming economy.
Spain challenged Portugal; Louis XIV and France challenged the Netherlands; Napoleon Bonaparte sought to bring down the UK; Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm II and Hitler brought an end to British hegemony for a second time.
By contrast, the 'challenger' nations have: closed systems; absolute rulers; domestic instability; continental geographic locations; and weaker naval power.
[21] 1, Modelski writes, 'a similar more modest process may have occurred in Italy from 1000-1500 which then grew from a regional to a world level'.
[25] It has developed in parallel with the growth of the nation-state, political parties, command of the sea, and 'dependency of pre-modern communities'.
Awareness of the cycle provides a balanced perspective, and a counter to the widespread belief in global anarchy.
[29] Modelski speculates that US deconcentration might be replaced by a power based in the 'Pacific rim' or by an explicit coalition of nations, as 'co-operation is urgently required in respect of nuclear weapons'.
His research, influenced by Immanuel Wallerstein, was 'measured in decades... a major achievement' says Peter J. Taylor[32] Colin Flint saw several flaws in the argument.
Flint also questions whether naval power is still relevant in a time of cruise missiles, satellites and drones.