The operations took place on the part of the Western Front held by the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), in French and Belgian Flanders.

By the end of the First Battle of Ypres in November 1914, both sides were exhausted, short of ammunition and suffering from collapses in morale, some infantry units refusing orders.

The costly and inconclusive result of the First Battle of Flanders was followed by trench warfare, in which both sides tried to improve their positions as far as the winter weather, mutual exhaustion and chronic equipment and ammunition shortages allowed.

A moving barrage of fire was proposed as a combination of both methods and became a standard practice once when guns and ammunition were accumulated in sufficient quantity.

[3] Falkenhayn issued memoranda on 7 and 25 January 1915, defining a model of defensive warfare to be used on the Western Front, to enable ground to be held with the fewest possible troops.

The building of the new defences took until the autumn of 1915 and confronted Franco-British offensives with an evolving system of field fortifications, which was able to absorb the increasing power and sophistication of attacks.

By the end of the First Battle of Ypres, both sides were exhausted, short of ammunition and suffering from collapses in morale; some infantry units refused orders.

[10] The mutual failure in Flanders led both sides to elaborate the improvised field fortifications of 1914, which made a return to mobile warfare even less likely.

[11] On 18 November, Falkenhayn took the unprecedented step of asking the Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, to negotiate a separate peace with Russia.

[12] A reorganisation of the defence of Flanders was carried out by the Franco–British from 15 to 22 November, which left the BEF holding a homogeneous front from Givenchy to Wytschaete, 21 mi (34 km) to the north.

On 23 November, the German Infantry Regiment 112 captured 800 yd (730 m) of trench east of Festubert, which were then recaptured by a night counter-attack by the Meerut Division, at a cost of 919 Indian Corps casualties.

The Eighth Army was ordered to attack in Flanders and Field Marshal Sir John French was asked to participate with the BEF on 14 December.

[14] On the left, the French XVI Corps failed to reach its objectives and the 3rd Division got to within 50 yd (46 m) of the German line and found uncut wire.

[15] At dawn on 20 December, the front of the Indian Corps, held by the Lahore and Meerut divisions was bombarded by German heavy artillery and mortars.

At 9:00 a.m., ten mines, of 110 lb (50 kg) each, were exploded under the British lines at Givenchy-lès-la-Bassée (Givenchy) and followed up by infantry attacks from the village northwards to La Quinque Rue.

The 1st Guards Brigade and French Territorial troops retook the village but the disruption of the counter-attack left a small amount of ground near Festubert on the northern flank in German hands.

[17] In January 1915, rain, snow and floods added to the dangers of sniping and artillery-fire during the day; at night both sides concentrated on repairing trenches.

The area from the old La Bassée battlefield to Kemmel, 20 mi (32 km) to the north, was mainly flat low-lying meadow, in the basin of the Lys (Leie) river.

[18] On 1 January, a German attack captured several British posts on a railway embankment at brick stacks near La Bassée Canal, in the vicinity of Cuinchy, held by the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division.

James Edmonds, the British official historian, called this a legitimate ruse, since an alert defender could be expected to challenge the party and allow only one man to approach.