After Oskar Lafontaine resigned from minister in March 1999, Flassbeck's work as a state secretary ended in April 1999 as well.

[2] In his early scientific career, in the 1980s, Flassbeck in particular dealt with questions of foreign trade theory (an area of International economics) and monetary policy.

In frame of a system of flexible currency rates a decision between protectionism and free trade could not be made and in addition the targeted national autonomy in monetary policy not be achieved.

He does not consider the reasons for the weak growth and mass unemployment of many years in Germany as a result of technological progress, globalization or too high wages, but as a consequence of a not demand-orientated policy.

Jahrhunderts) was released: shocks and crisis were the normality in a market economy system, periods of stability the exceptional case.

Flassbecks latest publication, the Ten Myths of Crisis (German: Zehn Mythen der Krise.

He assigns monetary policy an outstanding impact on growth and employment and refuses its shortening on retaining price stability.

It had been practised in the 1980s by some federal banks in response to the oil crisis and the stagflation going along with it in the 1970s but led to drop of investments and high unemployment.

Flassbeck emphasises the speciality of the German and European monetary policy, which, contrary to the majority of central banks, retained monetarism.

Flassbeck cites that the monetary policy of the German Bundesbank and the European Central Bank (ECB) to control the money supply ever geared to the potential output of the past.

Flassbeck also considers the target inflation rate of the ECB to be too low and refers to the height at other major central banks.

That could only be achieved by equalisation of growth of unit labour costs, with the aim to maintain the price competitiveness of all countries and to avoid high current account surpluses as well as deficits.

As solution for this problem, which he considers as the fundamental cause of the euro crisis, he proposes coordination of wage policies in the European monetary union.

In view of the facts that the option of revaluations and devaluations is not given anymore because of the abolition of national currencies, the only alternative was a real devaluation of states with high current account deficits such as Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy, as well as a real revaluation of Germany — brought by steadily higher wage increases in Germany than in the other eurozone countries.

[5] Flassbeck does not attribute the Wirtschaftswunder (German for economic miracle) in the 1950s and 1960s to the economic policy of Ludwig Erhard and his only partially applied concept of an ordoliberal social market economy, but to the American monetary policy which, during the time of the Bretton Woods system (until about 1973), had significantly influenced the German interest level.

Also, the steady exchange rates which often reflected an underrated D-Mark (former German currency), had essentially benefited the catching up of the other countries.

[6] In media Flassbeck frequently holds his views on economic policy and theory, which in part are in favour of Keynesianism and particularly Joseph Schumpeter and Wilhelm Lautenbach.