[2][6] Norman, who did not back down from how he felt about the incompetence of Mostowfi ol-Mamalek communicated to Lord Curzon about how the current British policy towards Iran is unpopular with the Iranian population and would cause more harm for Britain in the long-run.
[2] The evidence that Ghani provides are the fact that the telegraphs between Norman and George Curzon, 1st Marquess Curzon of Kedleston averaged around one a day, compared to the normal three times a day; and the odd series of events which had Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Smyth order 2200 men from the Cossack Qazvin division into Tehran for disciplining unruly soldiers from the Cossack division in Tehran, and then the subsequent reversal of the order by Norman with the request of Ahmad Shah Qajar.
[2] A motivating factor for Norman could have been the refusal of Fathollah Khan Akbar who served as prime minister of Iran to cooperate with the British regarding the 1919 agreement.
[2] This feeling might have been a result of the Anglo-Persian Agreement still not being implemented, British financial officers being hampered from doing their work, and finally the repeated difficulties in forming a competent cabinet.
[2] Ironside in his memoirs High Road to Command and his private unpublished diaries makes it very clear that he acted alone in arming and clothing the disheveled Persian Cossacks without the knowledge of the Foreign Office, Curzon or Norman to protect his rear in carrying out his orders to withdraw British forces from Iran and modern day Iraq.