[2] Some sources credit rumors as the spark which ignited violence, where many Korean soldiers were worried by the prospect of incorporating Japanese officers in a new army structure.

[4] Some explain the flare-up of violence by pointing to provocative policies and conduct by Japanese military advisors who had been training the new Special Skills Force since 1881.

[8] All foreigners were barred entry into the country except for Chinese officials on diplomatic missions, and the Japanese who were only allowed to trade at waegwan enclaves in Pusan.

[10] With his ascendancy to power the Daewongun initiated a set of reforms designed to strengthen the monarchy at the expense of the yangban class, he also pursued an isolationist policy and was determined to purge the kingdom of any foreign ideas that had infiltrated into the nation.

[12] In October 1873, when the Confucian scholar Choe Ik-hyeon submitted a memorial to King Gojong urging him to rule in his own right, Queen Min seized the opportunity to force her father-in-law's retirement as regent.

The Korean government immediately after the opening of the country to the outside world, pursued a policy of enlightenment aimed at achieving national prosperity and military strength through the doctrine of tongdo sŏgi,[13] or Eastern ways and Western machines.

Under this overarching organization were 12 sa or agencies, dealing with relations with China (Sadae), diplomatic matters involving other foreign nations (Kyorin), military affairs (Kunmu), border administration (Pyŏnjŏng), foreign trade (T'ongsang), military ordnance (Kunmul), machinery production (Kigye), shipbuilding (Sŏnham), coastal surveillance (Kiyŏn), personnel recruitment (Chŏnsŏn), special procurement (Iyong), and foreign-language schooling (Ŏhak).

The discourse over the two were interlinked, as the German military adviser Major Jacob Meckel stated, Korea was a "dagger pointed at the heart of Japan".

Not only would these reforms enable Korea to resist foreign intrusion, which was in Japan's direct interest, but in being a conduit of change, they would also have opportunity to play a larger role on the peninsula.

Subsequently, the Meiji government adopted a passive policy, encouraging the Korea court to follow the Japanese model but offering little concrete assistance except for the dispatch of the small military mission headed by Lieutenant Horimoto Reizo to train the Pyŏlgigun.

After negotiations through Chinese mediation (1881–1882), the Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation was formally signed between the United States and Korea in Incheon on May 22, 1882.

[24] Eighty to one hundred young men[nb 2] of the aristocracy were to be given Japanese military training and a formation called the Pyŏlgigun (Special Skills Force) was established.

Min, in turn, handed the matter over to his steward who sold the good rice he had been given and used the money to buy millet that he mixed with sand and bran.

One group of rioters headed to Lieutenant Horimoto's quarters and took turns in stabbing the military instructor, administering many small wounds until they slowly killed him.

At first they took refuge with the Incheon commandant but when word arrived of the events in Seoul, the attitude of their hosts changed and the Japanese realized they were no longer safe.

[25] The survivors carrying the wounded, then boarded a small boat and headed for the open sea where three days later they were rescued by a British surveyor ship, HMS Flying Fish.

[28] The day after the attack on the Japanese legation, on July 24, the rioters forced their way into the royal palace where they found and killed Min Gyeom-ho, as well as a dozen other high-ranking officers[28] including Heungin-gun Yi Choe-Heung, the older brother of the Daewongun, who was previously critical of Korea's isolation policy.

[28] The foreign office under Inoue Kaoru commanded Hanabusa to return to Seoul and meet with senior Korean officials and to persuade them to set a date by which the rioters would be brought to justice in a manner which was satisfactory to the Japanese government.

Hanabusa was instructed that if the Koreans showed any signs of hiding the perpetrators and not punishing them or if they refused to take part in any discussions with the Japanese, this would constitute a clear breach of peace.

[29] In that case, a final letter would be sent to the Korean government by an envoy, indicting it for its crimes and then Japanese forces would occupy the port of Chempulpo and await further orders.

[29] The incident could even provide a means of securing a lasting peace and in view of Korean national feelings, the Japanese had judged that it was premature to send a punitive expedition.

[29] Inoue Kaoru also notified western ministers in Tokyo of the government's decision to send troops and warships to Korea to protect Japanese citizens.

On August 1, Zhang Shuosheng dispatched ships of Beiyang Fleet under the command of Ding Ruchang to Korea with Ma Jianzhong on board by request of Joseon's Queen.

[1] On September 25, three high-ranking Chinese naval officers paid a courtesy call on the Daewongun and as they were leaving they asked him to attend an important meeting at their residence in the city.

Initially, there were the usual exchanges of politenesses between the two parties but at a signal,[nb 3] Chinese troops burst into the room seized the Daewongun and put him into a palanquin.

[31] Li ordered the Daewongun put back in his palanquin and he was carried off to a town about sixty miles southwest of Beijing, where for three years he was confined to one room and kept under strict surveillance.

[35] Furthermore, the Ch'in'gunyŏng, (Capital Guards Command) was also created consisting of four barracks designated the right, left, front, and rear; this new Korean military formation was trained along Chinese lines by Yuan Shikai.

[35] In October 1882, the two countries signed a treaty stipulating that Korea was a dependency of China and granted Chinese merchants the right to conduct overland and maritime business freely within Korean borders.

[34] Although it allowed Koreans reciprocally to trade in Beijing the agreement was not a treaty but was in effect issued as a regulation for a vassal,[33] it also reasserted Korea's dependency on China.

[38] Even Finance Minister Matsukata Masayoshi, who had implemented the fiscal retrenchment policy, agreed that financial resources had to be found for a military and naval buildup if the international situation required.