Following the "Balibo Declaration" that was signed by representatives of Apodeti, UDT, KOTA and the Trabalhista Party on 30 November 1975, Indonesian military forces invaded East Timor on 7 December 1975, and by 1979 they had all but destroyed the armed resistance to the occupation.

For twenty-four years, the Indonesian government subjected the people of East Timor to routine and systematic torture, sexual slavery, internment, forced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, massacres, and deliberate starvation.

[30] Indonesian nationalist and military hardliners, particularly leaders of the intelligence agency Kopkamtib and special operations unit, Kopassus, saw the Portuguese revolution as an opportunity for East Timor's integration with Indonesia.

The fear of national disintegration was played upon military leaders close to Suharto and remained as one of Indonesia's strongest justifications for refusing to entertain the prospect of East Timorese independence or even autonomy until the late 1990s.

By broadcasting accusations of communism among Fretilin leaders and sowing discord in the UDT coalition, the Indonesian government fostered instability in East Timor and, observers said, created a pretext for invading.

[44] Once they had gained control of East Timor, Fretilin faced attacks from the west, by Indonesian military forces—then known as Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI)—and by a small group of UDT troops.

"[64] In one incident, a group of fifty men, women, and children – including Australian freelance reporter Roger East – were lined up on a cliff outside of Dili and shot, their bodies falling into the sea.

Nations allied with Indonesia—including India, Japan, and Malaysia—wrote a resolution blaming Portugal and the Timorese political parties for the bloodshed; it was rejected in favour of a draft prepared by Algeria, Cuba, Senegal, and Guyana, among others.

[85] On 17 December, Indonesia formed the Provisional Government of East Timor (PSTT) which was headed by Arnaldo dos Reis Araújo of APODETI as president and Lopez da Cruz of UDT.

[88] Like the PSTT itself, the Popular Assembly is usually characterised as an instrument of propaganda created by the Indonesian military; although international journalists were invited to witness the group's meeting in May 1976, their movement was tightly constrained.

[108] The UN truth commission report confirmed the Indonesian military's use of enforced starvation as a weapon to exterminate the East Timorese civilian population, and that large numbers of people were "positively denied access to food and its sources".

[114] Indonesia announced that it was working through the government-run Indonesian Red Cross to alleviate the crisis, but the NGO Action for World Development charged that organisation with selling donated aid supplies.

[111] Known Indonesian abuses against women in East Timor were numerous and well-documented, though the true scope of the problem is difficult to ascertain, owing to the tight military control imposed during the occupation, compounded by the shame felt by victims.

[121] In 1999 researcher Rebecca Winters released the book Buibere: Voice of East Timorese Women, which chronicles many personal stories of violence and abuse dating to the earliest days of the occupation.

[123] A woman who had prepared food for Fretilin guerrillas was arrested, burned with cigarettes, tortured with electricity, and forced to walk naked past a row of soldiers into a tank filled with urine and faeces.

When Xanana sought to invoke Portugal and the UN in the negotiations, ABRI Commander Benny Moerdani broke the ceasefire by announcing a new counterinsurgency offensive called "Operational Clean-Sweep" in August 1983, declaring, "This time no fooling around.

[131] In 1983 Amnesty International published an Indonesian manual it had received from East Timor instructing military personnel on how to inflict physical and mental anguish, and cautioning troops to "Avoid taking photographs showing torture (of someone being given electric shocks, stripped naked and so on)".

Economic life in the towns was subsequently brought under the control of entrepreneurial Bugis, Makassarese, and Butonese immigrants from South Sulawesi, while East Timor products were exported under partnerships between army officials and Indonesian businessmen.

[149] East Timor, however, remained poor following centuries of Portuguese colonial neglect and Indonesian critic George Aditjondro points out that conflict in the early years of occupation leads to sharp drops in rice and coffee production and livestock populations.

[156] The reduced fear of persecution encouraged the resistance movements; anti-integration protests accompanied high-profile visits to East Timor, including that of Pope John Paul II in 1989.

[172] The arrest of the universally acknowledged leader of the resistance was a major frustration to the anti-integration movement in East Timor, but Gusmão continued to serve as a symbol of hope from inside the Cipinang prison.

[176] The Nobel Committee indicated in its press release that it hoped the award would "spur efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict in East Timor based on the people's right to self-determination".

In public statements the government tried to put distance between the two laureates, grudgingly recognising the prize for Bishop Belo, over whom it thought it could exercise some control, but accusing Ramos-Horta of responsibility for atrocities during the civil strife in East Timor and declaring that he was a political opportunist.

[177]Diplomats from Indonesia and Portugal, meanwhile, continued the consultations required by the 1982 General Assembly resolution, in a series of meetings intended to resolve the problem of what Foreign Minister Ali Alatas called the "pebble in the Indonesian shoe".

"[187] As militia leaders warned of a "bloodbath", Indonesian "roving ambassador" Francisco Lopes da Cruz declared: "If people reject autonomy there is the possibility blood will flow in East Timor.

However, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Portuguese government appeared reluctant to push the issue; American Indonesia specialist Benedict Anderson suggests this stemmed from uncertainty at the time over its application to the European Community.

[230] The Clinton administration, under the Pentagon's JCET program, trained the Indonesian Kopassus special forces in urban guerrilla warfare, surveillance, counter-intelligence, sniper tactics and 'psychological operations'.

The complete names of around 2,300 Indonesian soldiers and pro-Indonesian militias who died in action as well as from illness and accidents during the entire occupation are engraved into the Seroja Monument located in Armed Forces Headquarters in Cilangkap, East Jakarta.

The 1999 UN Security Council resolution authorising UNTAET described the history of "systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international and human rights law" and demanded "that those responsible for such violence be brought to justice".

Although an international court could not pursue all of them, it ... [would] confirm that the invasion, occupation and destruction of East Timor by Indonesia was a long-standing, systematic, criminal conspiracy, planned and ordered at the highest levels of government.