Internal Settlement
[8] Late in 1976, Ian Smith, after his attempted internal settlement with Joshua Nkomo of the ZAPU failed, accepted the basic elements of the compromise proposals made by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to introduce majority rule within two years.
[9][8] The Smith Government then sought to negotiate an acceptable settlement with moderate black leaders, while retaining strong white influence in key areas.
[13] The agreement led to the creation of an interim government in which Africans were included in leading positions for the first time, while creating an independent civil service, judiciary, police force, and army.
[26] However, the lifting of sanctions did not occur mainly because the Patriotic Front, composed of the externally based African nationalist parties of ZAPU and ZANU under the respective leadership of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, had not been involved in the political process and had not participated in the general election.
Under mounting international pressure, particularly from Jimmy Carter, Andrew Young and the British Government, Muzorewa was persuaded to take part in negotiations at Lancaster House late 1979.
[27] The agreement at the Lancaster House Conference between the Zimbabwe Rhodesia and British Governments, ZAPU and ZANU in December 1979 resulted in a ceasefire and the end of the Rhodesian Bush War.
[34][35][18] Each of the Frontline States – Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia – condemned the settlement as a "sell-out" and accused Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau of being complicit with the Rhodesian government, which they saw as illegal.
[34] The Council of Ministers of the Organisation of African Unity had several days earlier – at its thirtieth ordinary session in Tripoli, Libya, from 20 to 28 February 1978 – foreseen the prospect of a settlement, and issued a statement condemning any agreement that did not include the Patriotic Front.
[40] In addition, Max T. Chigwida of the South African Institute of International Affairs stated that the agreement's terms had been subjected to a "lot of criticisms and propaganda based on...motives by all sorts of critics"[3] while scholar Tendai Mutunhu said the settlement created a "puppet black regime", prevented a socialist government in Zimbabwe, said the "masses" in the country opposed it, and claimed that the settlement was being supported by huge transnational corporations and foreign investors.
[41] Prompted by the request of the African Group within the United Nations, the UN Security Council of discussed the issue of Rhodesia's internal settlement at its 2061st to 2067th meetings from 6–14 March 1978.
[44] Scholars Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore noted that although Rhodesia had taken a "momentous step" toward a primarily Black government, the country would not have "lasting peace" and international recognition until exiled nationalists were accommodated.
[45] Zimbabwean scholar Richard S. Maposa stated, in 2013, that although there was "no international recognition" for the settlement, which he described as a "painful interlude", it still facilitated the "transitional process" of the country toward Black majority rule.
