[4][5] As of March 2024 there are 187 Member States of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, the latest of which to join was Somalia, which signed the treaty on 8 September 2023.

[13] On 19 November 2018, the CTBTO announced that all 21 monitoring facilities located in Australia were completed "and sending reliable, high-quality data ... in Vienna, Austria, for analysis.

[20] Such is the wide net cast for assorted phenomena by IMS that analysis its plethora of data has discovered the song of heretofore unknown (and as yet unseen) pygmy sperm whales.

[21][22] Annual conferences are held for the wider scientific community, national departments involved in the CBTO's work, diplomats, independent academic and research institutions, the media, and civil society at large.

[15] The Global Communications Infrastructure (GCI) transmits all data collected by the 337 IMS stations in real time to the IDC in Vienna, where it will be processed.

This concept describes the decision making, communication, reporting structures and procedures required for the functioning of an inspection team during an OSI.

The framework for the technical and scientific work of the inspection team is the information-led search logic designed to maximize efficiency and effectiveness in collecting facts and information.

Exercises allow various inspection activities, techniques, processes and procedures to be tested and refined in the context of a tactical scenario environment.

The organization conducts a variety of exercises, the main difference being the objectives, scope and environment in which they take place (i.e. indoors, outdoors or a combination thereof).

[13][25][26] If a Member State feels that a date bulletin from the IDC implies a nuclear explosion, it can request a consultation and clarification process.

In order to fine-tune the IMS network, and to build confidence in the system, Member States are advised to notify the CTBTO Technical Secretariat in the case of any chemical explosion using more than 300 tonnes of TNT-equivalent blasting material.

[27] Throughout the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster of March 2011, the CTBTO's radionuclide stations tracked the dispersion of radioactivity on a global scale.

The CTBTO shared its data and analysis with its 187 Member States, as well as international organizations and some 1,200 scientific and academic institutions in 120 countries.

Since the only evidence for Flight 370's final resting site comes from an analysis of its satellite transmissions, which has resulted in an imprecise and very large search area, hydroacoustic recordings from CTBTO were analyzed to potentially determine and locate its impact with the Indian Ocean.

Analysis of available hydroacoustic recordings (including those made by a CTBTO hydrophone located off Cape Leeuwin, Western Australia) identified one event which may be associated with Flight 370.

Within two hours of the explosion, CTBTO Member States received initial information about the time, location and magnitude of the blast.

Two weeks after the blast, a monitoring station at Yellowknife in northern Canada detected traces of the radioactive noble gas xenon in the air.

[36][37] In the morning of 12 February 2013 (at 02.57.51 UTC), the CTBTO monitoring system detected another unusual seismic event in North Korea, which measured 4.9 in magnitude.

[38] The analysed data showed the event's location (with a certainty of about +/- 8.1 km) was largely identical with the two previous nuclear tests (Lat.

[39] The CTBTO radionuclide network later made a significant detection of radioactive isotopes of xenon – xenon-131m and xenon-133 – that could be attributed to the nuclear test.

The detection was made at the radionuclide station in Takasaki, Japan, located at around 1,000 kilometres, or 620 miles, from the North Korean test site.

[40][41] Using Atmospheric Transport Modelling, which calculates the three-dimensional travel path of airborne radioactivity on the basis of weather data, the North Korean test site was identified as a possible source for the emission.