Since ISGS' formation in October 2016 and the creation of the JNIM coalition in 2017, the two groups had been described as the Sahelien exception or Sahelien anomaly: despite the global war between al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates since the latter's splinter from the former in 2014, both ISGS and JNIM have ignored each other and in rare cases worked together against Malian, Nigerien, Burkinabe, French, and international governments and non-Islamist militias until 2020.

[8] According to Tammy Palacios, Senior Analyst & Manager of the Priority Sustainable Counterterrorism portfolio at the New Lines Institute and Modern War Institute at West Point Fellow – JNIM's territorial expansion is largely due to this civilian engagement strategy and differentiates the two groups in the region, in terms of their operational strategies.

[12] Al-Mourabitoun eventually rejoined AQIM that same year, and MOJWA founder Sultan Ould Bady had formed his own group Katibat Salaheddin in 2013.

[12] Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) became al-Qaeda's affiliate in the Sahel, and was led by the Tuareg Ghaly and Fulani Koufa.

[4] Despite al-Qaeda and the Islamic State being at war globally after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi broke off from the former to create the latter in 2014, JNIM and ISGS commanders maintained contact with one another and even coordinated attacks with each other.

[2] Nsaibia and Weiss reported that while a variety of factors drove ISGS and JNIM to war with one another, the main reasons were ideological splits, Sahrawi's faction becoming inducted as a part of ISWAP in March 2019, and the subsequent outward growth and territorial influence by ISGS as central Islamic State leadership urged it to be more confrontational with JNIM.

ISGS's induction into the global Islamic State also intensified differences in their treatment of local populations and ethnic and clan alliances, sparking many defections from Katiba Macina and other groups.

[2] JNIM propaganda written in early 2020 by Qutaybah Abu Numan al-Shinqiti, a Mauritanian Islamic scholar sympathetic to al-Qaeda, stated that JNIM needed to implement sharia law slowly to gain the trust of local populations in contrast to the Islamic State's immediate and harsh implementations, although the propaganda piece did not mention ISGS by name.

[18] JNIM audio messages in Tamacheq, Fulfulde, Arabic, and other local languages also called on Muslims to resist the khawarij, a pejorative term for the Islamic State, and dubbed ISGS' growing influence as a test to separate true believes from false ones in the Sahel.

Most media output by ISGS prior to the merger was rudimentary and there was little collaboration with global Islamic State messaging.

[25] By early 2020, the clashes had spread to Fassala on the Malian-Mauritanian border, the first reported battle outside of areas traditionally controlled by Katiba Macina.

[19] Neither side acknowledged the clashes until the May 2020 issue of Al-Naba where ISGS accused JNIM of working with the Malian government and ethnic militias, and specifically targeted their attacks toward Kouffa and Ghaly.

[18] In that same issue of al-Naba, ISGS claimed to have fought battles with Ansarul Islam near the Ghanaian border with Burkina Faso.

These civilian attacks were intensified due to ISGS' loss in late 2020 as the group fought a war against every other actor in the region.

[28] Around this same time, JNIM attempted to improve its image among the people it governed and to outside areas by establishing Islamic courts, redistributing wealth from their taxes, and allowing NGOs to operate in territory under their influence to distribute aid.

[29] JNIM also increased its efforts to establish non-aggression pacts and peace treaties with rival ethnic groups and pro-government militias, succeeding with the Niono Agreement that helped break the siege of Farabougou in October 2020.

[31] JNIM's kidnapping of Burkinabe Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) militiamen were moreso to maintain control over JNIM-occupied territory.

[31] Many of these illicit economic activities took place in southern and eastern Burkina Faso and along the Beninese and Nigerien borders, where the Burkinabe state had little control and the presence of ISGS was minimal.

[32] The aforementioned Tchoma Bangou and Zaroumdareye massacres also sparked backlash from non-Fulani groups like the Zarma, who began attacking Fulani villages and civilians, accusing them of supporting ISGS.

[34] The offensive gained steam due to the inhibition of the JNIM threat, growing discontent in the region with the Malian junta officials and the Wagner Group mercenaries that entered the country in early 2022, and an increase in ISGS support from the central Islamic State.

[36] The offensive in Menaka saw many defections to the ISGS in the region in territories that were formerly under JNIM influence and control in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.

[37][38] This truce broke on November 3, 2022, when an al-Naba publication by ISGS announced the killing of forty JNIM fighters in Mali's Menaka region.

[37][39] The clashes between the two groups intensified in December 2022 during fighting that killed dozens of fighters on either side across several battles along with over seventy civilians.

This statement only gained credence after the January 2022 and September 2022 Burkinabe coups d'état that brought a junta in Burkina Faso that conducted more attacks on civilians in the name of stopping JNIM and ISGS.

[43] While hostilities between JNIM and ISGS were fierce in 2022 and 2023, they were not as intense and common as those of 2019 and 2020 due to financial strain and both groups having a bigger enemy in the Malian, Burkinabe, and Nigerien juntas.

[45] Many populations sympathetic to JNIM and ISGS see the price of living under sharia law worth it compared to being attacked by Malian, Burkinabe, or Nigerien soldiers.