Attacks, Incidents or Battles Massacres The Japanese embassy hostage crisis (Spanish: Toma de la residencia del embajador de Japón en Lima, Japanese: 在ペルー日本大使公邸占拠事件, romanized: Zai Perū Nihon taishi kōtei senkyo jiken) began on 17 December 1996 in Lima, Peru, when 14 terrorist members of the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) took hostage hundreds of high-level diplomats, government and military officials and business executives.
[4] The surprise ambush and seizure of the Japanese ambassador's residence was the highest profile operation of the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) in its 15-year history.
Fujimori made his speech shortly after MRTA leader Néstor Cerpa Cartolini announced that he would gradually release any hostages who were not connected to the Peruvian government.
[8] In search for a peaceful solution, Fujimori appointed a team to hold talks with the MRTA, including the Canadian ambassador Anthony Vincent, who had briefly been a hostage, Archbishop Juan Luis Cipriani, and a Red Cross official.
Fujimori even talked with the Cuban leader Fidel Castro, raising media speculation that a deal was being worked out to let the MRTA guerrillas go to Cuba as political exiles.
This prompted the Prime Minister of Japan, Ryutaro Hashimoto, to publicly urge Peru to refrain from taking any unnecessary risks that could endanger the hostages' lives.
Japanese leaders pressured Fujimori to reach some sort of negotiated settlement with the MRTA in order to ensure the hostages' safe release.
"[13] In February, Peruvian newspaper La República reported the existence of a secret government "intervention plan," involving the direct participation of U.S. military forces.
The plan was reportedly devised by Navy Admiral and Director of Peru's Army Intelligence Agency, Antonio Ibarcena and submitted to Fujimori.
[15] In preparation for the raid, Peruvian Navy Admiral and former commander of a special operations group, Antonio Ibarcena distributed hundreds of bugged items to the hostages.
Cerpa himself unwittingly helped with this part of the project when, upon hearing noises that made him suspect that a tunnel was being dug, he ordered all the hostages placed on the second floor.
[citation needed] In addition, sophisticated miniature microphones and video cameras had been smuggled into the residence, concealed in books, water bottles, and table games.
Eavesdropping on the MRTA commandos with the help of these high-tech devices, military planners observed that the insurgents had organized their security carefully, and were particularly alert during the night hours.
Through the hole created by that blast and the other two explosions, 30 commandos stormed into the building, chasing the surviving MRTA members in order to stop them before they could reach the second floor.
In the first, 20 commandos launched a direct assault at the front door in order to join their comrades inside the waiting room, where the main staircase to the second floor was located.
At the end, all 14 MRTA guerrillas, one hostage (Dr. Carlos Giusti Acuña, member of the Supreme Court, who had pre-existing heart health problems[relevant?])
[citation needed] According to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), MRTA member Roli Rojas was discovered attempting to walk out of the residence mixed with the hostages.
According to a Defense Intelligence Agency report, Fujimori personally ordered the commandos participating in the raid to "take no MRTA alive."
As the commandos tore down the flag of the MRTA that had been flying at the roof of the embassy, Fujimori joined some of the former hostages in singing the Peruvian national anthem.
Several Andean Presidents (Ernesto Samper of Colombia, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada of Bolivia and Rafael Caldera of Venezuela) supported Alberto Fujimori's decisions.
Saying that "we had no illusions" that Fujimori wanted a peaceful solution, Velasco added, "we did have some bit of hope that international public opinion in many countries would increase pressure on the Peruvian government and force them to give in."
Alluding to the underlying economic conditions of the country, she observed: "A vast segment of the population still suffers from poverty, hunger and a lack of proper medical care, and these problems are increasing.
Rumors began to circulate not long after the rescue operation that surrendered MRTA members had been executed extrajudicially: Media reports also discussed a possible breach of international practices on taking of prisoners, committed on what they, under rules of diplomatic extraterritoriality, the equivalence of sovereign Japanese soil, and speculated that if charged, Fujimori could face prosecution in Japan.
[58] On 2 January 2001, the Peruvian human-rights organization APRODEH filed a criminal complaint on behalf of MRTA family members against Alberto Fujimori, Vladimiro Montesinos, Nicolás De Bari Hermoza Ríos, Julio Salazar Monroe and anyone found to be guilty of the crime of the qualified homicide of Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez and two other MRTA militants.
Non-commissioned National Police officers Raúl Robles Reynoso and Marcial Teodorico Torres Arteaga corroborated Hidetaka Ogura's testimony, telling investigators that they took Eduardo Cruz Sánchez alive as he was attempting to get away by mingling with the hostages when they were at the house in back of the residence.
In an interview in March, Ad Hoc Deputy Attorney Ronald Gamarra Herrera told CPN radio that Fujimori should face murder charges over the alleged executions: "[We have] information regarding how post-mortems were conducted on the dead MRTA rebels, which in opinion could corroborate accusations of extrajudicial killings."
The UN bill "granted amnesty" to army General José Williams Zapata, who headed up the operation, and to the "official personnel who participated in the freeing and rescue of the hostages."
HRW argued that the amnesty proposals clearly conflicted with the principles enunciated by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its March 2001 ruling against the Peruvian government in the case of the 1991 Barrios Altos massacre.
[59] On 7 June 2002, at a ceremony organized by the army to commemorate loyalty to the national flag, the commandos were honored and decorated, including those whom the judicial branch had under investigation for alleged involvement in the extrajudicial executions.
[61] In 2007 the former head of Peru's security services, Vladimiro Montesinos, the former chief of the armed forces, Nicolas de Bari Hermoza [es], and retired Colonel Roberto Huaman went on trial for allegedly having ordered the extra-judicial killings of the MRTA hostage-takers.