He also argues that, in Lloyd C. Gardner's words, "the Nixinger case that the war had been won were it not for a last minute failure of will, has been built upon a lengthy series of "ifs," none of which were real alternatives at the time".
[7] In this book, Kimball published a collection of primary source documents, mostly from the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, with an introduction written by him.
He also reproduces two documents cited as evidence that Nixon and Kissinger hoped to achieve a "decent interval" between American withdrawal and the fall of South Vietnam.
[6] In this book, Kimball and his co-author, William Burr, focus on the nuclear threats issued by the Nixon Administration towards the end of the Vietnam War.
[10] Luke A. Nichter disagreed that the "decent interval" theory adequately explains Nixon Administration policies, because according to him the president's outlook went rapidly up and down depending on casualty figures and news reports.