His conclusion was that by 1965, before the large scale introduction of American military forces into the war, the communist Viet Cong had already won the battle of "Hearts and Minds".
Race lived in Thailand for most of the subsequent years, self-employed as an adviser to the U.S. military and American companies doing business in Southeast Asia.
[2] The precursor to War Comes to Long An was Race's 1970 article titled "How They Won" which summarized the findings he would present two years later in the book.
[5] Race makes the point that the communist victory in Long An was accomplished primarily in the pre-military phase (before 1960) of the Vietnam War by gaining the support of landless, poor, and middle-class peasants.
The government consisted of "outsiders", dictated from above, offered little promotion potential for rural and local leaders, and excluded most people from consideration for positions of influence and power.
By contrast, the communists focused on recruiting their followers from the lowest social and economic classes and promoted the most promising to leadership positions.
The Communist Party structured its appeal by relating to the "social fabric of rural communities by ties of family, friendship, and common interest.
"[8] Race concluded his analysis by stating that the communist victory in Long An was not inevitable, but furthered by the lack of understanding of the revolutionary movement by the South Vietnamese government and its foreign advisers, mostly Americans.
[10] Despite Race's contention that neither South Vietnam nor the United States understood the roots of the communist insurgency, he attempted to avoid moral judgments and maintain objectivity.