In this case, evidence against the defendant was probably seized illegally, violating the Fourth Amendment, but he lost the chance to argue that point due to his lawyer's ineffectiveness.

That meant it had less weight than individual trial rights when weighed against the social costs of redundant litigation that "often frees the guilty" and "may well have the..effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration of justice".

[3] Over the next few years, there was disagreement among courts and legal scholars as to how far this ruling should apply, particularly when a defense attorney had incompetently failed to make a Fourth Amendment claim.

[4] That physical evidence included a bedsheet from Morrison's bed, from which the technicians had recovered incriminating hair, blood, and semen samples.

When the bedsheet was introduced on the second day of trial, the defendant's lawyer objected on the grounds it had been seized without a warrant (violating the Fourth Amendment).

Other than arguing that the separate charges should be merged (something the Appellate Division would grant), he made two arguments related to the contested evidence: 1) that his previous lawyer's failure to make an objection at the proper time was ineffective assistance of counsel, violating the Sixth Amendment, and 2) that the trial court had erred by not hearing his lawyer's objection (about the bedsheet and related testimony) during the trial, violating the Fourth Amendment.

[4] In 1983, Morrison filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court, again arguing that his lawyer had provided ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the use of the bedsheet as evidence violated the Fourth Amendment.

The district court relied on Third Circuit precedent (namely U.S. v. Baynes,[7] Moore v. U.S.,[8] and U.S. v. Swinehart[9]) which measured effective assistance by "the customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place," and also required plaintiffs to show they were "prejudiced", i.e. that it was not "harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.

This meant the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had to decide whether Morrison's Sixth Amendment claim held up under the new standard.

Regarding Stone v. Powell, the Court noted that other Circuits had come to different conclusions about how it applied to ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

[14] The Supreme Court voted 9–0 to affirm the decision of the Third Circuit; the only differences of opinion were about how to apply Stone v. Powell to future cases.

In order to prevail, the complainant need prove only that the search or seizure was illegal and that it violated his reasonable expectation of privacy in the item or place at issue.

[1] Third, the majority did not buy the state's argument that allowing ineffective-assistance claims where the underlying error was a failure to press a Fourth Amendment issue would let prisoners circumvent Stone.

Prisoners would also have to prove that their lawyer handled the viable Fourth Amendment incompetently at trial, and that the error was prejudicial under the "highly demanding" Strickland standard.

Even so, the Court felt this burden was met:Viewing counsel's failure to conduct any discovery from his perspective at the time he decided to forgo that stage of pretrial preparation and applying a "heavy measure of deference," to his judgment, we find counsel's decision unreasonable, that is, contrary to prevailing professional norms.

The justifications Morrison's attorney offered for his omission betray a startling ignorance of the law — or a weak attempt to shift blame for inadequate preparation.With regard to the prejudicial effect requirement, the state tried to argue that the case should not be remanded for a new hearing, because the prosecution's other evidence had clearly been strong enough to convict even if the bedsheet had been excluded.

[1] The state relied on comments the trial judge had made during a post-conviction hearing for bail pending appeal, to the effect that the other evidence and witnesses had been more important than the bedsheet, and "[t]he sheet was just one small phase in this whole case.

However, he writes,The more difficult question is whether the admission of illegally seized but reliable evidence can ever constitute "prejudice" under Strickland.

Given that this question was not properly presented to the court, Powell did not think it appropriate to make a ruling on the matter, but he felt the majority had glossed over the issue.

[15] The state did concede that the bedsheet was seized illegally, but it tried to argue, relying on the language of Powell's concurrence, that violations of the exclusionary rule could never be prejudicial under Strickland, but the court said the argument was "specifically rejected" by the majority.

"[15] On the substance of the prejudice requirement, the Court found that the Strickland standard was fairly close to the test it had used before, and the writ of habeas corpus would be granted.

The state had a better argument for its legality, though, as the co-owner of the shop had possibly given permission for the search; it also turned out that cross-examination about the pantyhose undermined some of the victim's testimony.

That decision was appealed, and in 1987, the New Jersey Appellate Division applied the Strickland test, finding that Goodman was indeed incompetent, but the error had helped as much as it had hurt, so the prejudice requirement was not satisfied.