David Leroy Washington and an accomplice decided to rob and kill Daniel Pridgen, a homosexual minister, on September 20, 1976.

He told the trial he had no significant criminal record and committed the crimes under extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family.

The trial judge told Washington that he had "a great deal of respect for people who are willing to step forward and admit their responsibility.

Washington then sought collateral relief in state court alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance at the sentencing proceeding.

The plain fact is that the aggravating circumstances proved in this case were completely overwhelming..." The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Washington's sentences on direct appeal, holding that:[3] [A] confession plus numerous aggravating factors limit the alternatives of the most zealous of advocates...counsel's failure to investigate medical reports and cross-examine the medical examiners could not be prejudicial since the facts of the reports were admitted by defendant in his confession.

They also said "the court erred in attaching any probative value whatsoever to Judge Fuller's testimony" about whether the errors asserted by Washington would have made a difference at sentencing.

When the defendant challenges his conviction, he must show that counsel's errors prevented the jury from forming a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

The assessments must be made with respect to the totality of the evidence presented at the hearing so that when the prosecution's case is weak, the defendant will more easily show prejudice.

In view of those considerations, the Court could not conclude that additional mitigating evidence would have given rise to a reasonable probability that the trial judge would have sentenced Washington to life in prison rather than death.

Justice Brennan concurred in the result because he believed that the Court's new test for ineffective assistance, particularly the prejudice prong, would not impede the presentation of mitigating evidence on behalf of capital defendants: Counsel's general duty to investigate ... takes on supreme importance to a defendant in the context of developing mitigating evidence to present to a judge or jury considering the sentence of death; claims of ineffective assistance in the performance of that duty should therefore be considered with commensurate care.However, because Justice Brennan believed that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment, he would have vacated Washington's death sentence and remanded for further proceedings.

He considered the performance standard "so malleable that, in practice, it will either have no grip at all or will yield excessive variation in the manner in which the Sixth Amendment is interpreted and applied by different courts."

After all, Marshall pointed out, "a person of means, by selecting a lawyer and paying him enough to ensure he prepares thoroughly, usually can obtain better representation than that available to an indigent defendant, who must rely on appointed counsel, who, in turn, has limited time and resources to devote to a given case."

Marshall also disputed that counsel's performance must be given especially wide latitude, since "much of the work involved in preparing for trial, applying for bail, conferring with one's client, making timely objections to significant, arguably erroneous rulings of the trial judge, and filing a notice of appeal if there are colorable grounds therefor could profitably be made the subject of uniform standards."

That and in light of the "severity and irrevocability of the sanction at stake," the standard for effective assistance in capital sentencing proceedings must be especially stringent.