Korean nationalism

They have witnessed and participated in a wide range of nationalist actions over the past century, but all of them have been some form of resistance against foreign influences.

Korea was divided at the 38th parallel between north and south by the Allied powers in 1945 as part of the disarmament of Imperial Japan, and the division persists to this day.

Each regime espouses its own distinctive form of nationalism, different from the opposing side's, that nonetheless seeks to encompass the entire Korean Peninsula in its scope.

The process towards this was started by the historic June 15th North–South Joint Declaration in August 2000, where the two countries agreed to work towards a peaceful reunification in the future.

Short-term problems such as a large number of refugees that would migrate from the North into the South and initial economic and political instability would need to be overcome.

[9][10][11] It is centered on the notion of the minjok (민족; 民族), a term that had been coined in Imperial Japan ("minzoku") in the early Meiji period.

For example, centre-right Kim Kyu-sik formed the National Independence Federation (centered around the minjok) and opposed the construction of a South Korean independent government promoted by Syngman Rhee; centre-left Lyuh Woon-hyung also opposed far-left proletarian internationalism and argued that "Korean minjok'" interests were more important.

After Japan relinquished control of Korea, Myers argues, the theory was subsequently adjusted to promote the idea of a pure Korean ethnicity.

"[31] Campbell argued that her interviews showed that many young South Koreans have no problems to accepting foreigners as part of uri nara.

The word literally means "main body" or "subject"; it has also been translated in North Korean sources as "independent stand" and the "spirit of self-reliance".

Thanks in part to decades of skillful propaganda, North Koreans generally equate the race with their state, so that ethno-nationalism and state-loyalty are mutually enforcing.

However, contrary to how the North Korean government have stated on this matter, Park Il, a Koryo Saram who worked as a translator for the 25th Army of the Soviet Union, recalled that Doobong Kim, the vice chairman of the Interim People's Committee, who was summoned by general Lebedv explained the meaning of the taoist symbol in the middle and the four markings on each corner to Lebedv, who dismissed this by responding that "These symbols represent East Asian feudalism", and that "Today seems to mark the very day that the decision to abolish the Taegukki has been made".

Park also reminisced that after a few months, he had received a call from Moscow where the design for the flag of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was explained to him in Russian, which he then translated to Korean.

[52] However, an example of state nationalism can also be seen in South Korea, such as Park Chung Hee's authoritarian politics, which was similar to the Japanese Shōwa statism[53] In 2007, the U.N. Committee on the International Convention Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination urged better education on the pure blood theory, especially for judicial workers such as police officers, lawyers, prosecutors and judges.

[60] Another legislation aimed at improving the integration of ethnic minorities into South Korean society, the Support for Multicultural Families Act was passed in 2008[61] but revised in 2011.

North and South Korea have both lodged severe protests against visits by Japanese officials to the Yasukuni Shrine, which is seen as glorifying the Class A war criminals whose remains are held there.

Disagreements over demands for reparations and a formal apology still remain unresolved despite the previous agreement and compensation in 1965, South Koreans started peaceful vigils in 1992 held by survivors on a weekly basis.

According to Robert E. Kelly, a professor at Pusan National University, anti-Japanese sentiment in South Korea stems not just from Japanese atrocities during the occupation period, but also from the Korean Peninsula's division.

[67][verification needed] Theoretical explanation for the link between Korean division and persistent anti-Japanese sentiment has been offered in scholarship utilizing an ontological security framework.

Since 1954, the South Koreans have administered the islands but bickering on both sides involving nationalism and lingering historical acrimony has led to the current impasse.

Adding to this problem is political pressure from conservative politicians and nationalist groups in both South Korea and Japan to have more assertive territorial policies.

[74] Tensions escalated in 1996 when both governments declared a 200-nautical-mile (400 km) EEZ that encompassed the island, which brought Japan-South Korean relations to an all-time low.

[75][verification needed][76] For Koreans, "historical memory and feelings of han (resentment) run deeply and can influence Korea's relations with its neighbors, allies, and enemies in ways not easily predicted by models of policy-making predicated on realpolitik or other geo-strategic or economic concerns.

President Roh emphasizes this point again by saying: "Dokdo for us is not merely a matter pertaining to territorial rights over tiny islets but is emblematic of bringing closure to an unjust chapter in our history with Japan and of the full consolidation of Korea's sovereignty.

[83] As the French theorist Ernest Renan said, "Where national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort.

When asked for the reason of their antipathy, most Koreans mentioned the territorial dispute over the island, and the Japanese the anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea.

This is in contrast to a 2002 survey (post 2002 FIFA World Cup) conducted by the Chosun Ilbo and Mainichi Shimbun, where 35% of Koreans and 69% of Japanese had friendly views of the other country.

Robert Hathaway, director of the Wilson Center's Asia program, suggests: "the growth of anti-American sentiment in both Japan and South Korea must be seen not simply as a response to American policies and actions, but as reflective of deeper domestic trends and developments within these Asian countries.

[88] Speaking to the Wilson Center, Katherine Moon was noted by Hathaway as suggesting that "anti-Americanism also represents the collective venting of accumulated grievances that in many instances have lain hidden for decades", but that despite the "very public demonstrations of anger toward the United States [...] the majority of Koreans of all age groups supports the continuation of the American alliance.

[96] The legislation proposed by 59 South Korean lawmakers would have declared the Gando Convention signed under Japanese rule to be "null and void".