In October 2016, a California highway patrol officer witnessed Arthur Lange driving while playing loud music and honking his horn.

After smelling alcohol on his breath and conducting a field sobriety test, the officer arrested Lange and charged him with driving under the influence and a noise infraction.

Lange attempted to argue at trial that the officer's entry into his garage without a warrant had violated his Fourth Amendment rights and therefore evidence related to the case had to be suppressed.

Roberts argued that police should have the flexibility to pursue suspected criminals regardless of the crime while noting that the ruling will confound law enforcement.

The Fourth Amendment and our precedent—not to mention common sense—provide a clear answer: The officer can enter the property to complete the arrest he lawfully initiated outside it.

Holding that flight, on its own, can never justify a warrantless entry into a home (including its curtilage), the Court requires that the officer: (1) stop and consider whether the suspect—if apprehended—would be charged with a misdemeanor or a felony, and (2) tally up other “exigencies” that might be present or arise, ante, at 1, 4, before (3) deciding whether he can complete the arrest or must instead seek a warrant—one that, in all likelihood, will not arrive for hours.

And we have never held that whether an officer may enter a home to complete an arrest turns on what the fleeing individual was suspected of doing before he took off, let alone whether that offense would later be charged as a misdemeanor or felony.

It is the flight, not the underlying offense, that has always been understood to justify the general rule: “Police officers may enter premises without a warrant when they are in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect.”I join the majority opinion, except for Part II–A, which correctly rejects the argument that suspicion that a person committed any crime justifies warrantless entry into a home in hot pursuit of that person.

I join the relevant parts of the majority on the understanding that its general case-by-case rule does not foreclose historical, categorical exceptions.

The Court holds that an officer may make a warrantless entry into a home when pursuing a fleeing misdemeanant if an exigent circumstance is also present—for example, when there is a risk of escape, destruction of evidence, or harm to others.

I also join Part II of JUSTICE THOMAS’s concurrence regarding how the exclusionary rule should apply to hot pursuit cases.