Larry Temkin is an American philosopher and Distinguished Professor Emeritus of philosophy at Rutgers University.
Temkin also challenges the conventional view that equality is holistic (that it is concerned mainly with groups) and that it is essentially distributive.
And while equality is indeed a distributive principle, Temkin argues that what makes it distinctive is that it is essentially comparative – it expresses a fundamental concern for how individuals fare relative to each other.
Temkin argues that the egalitarian’s fundamental concern should not be with luck per se but with comparative fairness[citation needed].
On the other hand, egalitarians might well have reason to object if Betty injures herself saving a drowning child, and thus ends up worse off than others, even if the injury is a result of responsible free choice.
So, for example, it is argued that there is no respect in which putting out the eyes of the sighted would improve matters even though this would make everyone equally blind.
[citation needed] He argues that this objection derives much of its force from a widespread assumption – welfarism – according to which nothing matters morally except insofar as it impacts individual wellbeing.
In general, Temkin argues that we value fairness and justice beyond the extent to which they are good for people.
This view first appeared under the name “the priority view” in Derek Parfit’s renowned 1991 article “Equality or Priority.” But the idea dates back to Temkin’s 1983 Ph.D. thesis, where it was presented under the name “extended humanitarianism.” And the word “prioritarianism” first appears in Temkin’s “Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection”.
Beginning with his groundbreaking ‘Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox,’ and culminating in his magnum opus, [citation needed] Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals, and the Nature of Practical Reasoning, Temkin has given a series of powerful arguments that call into question deeply held assumptions about value and about the nature of practical reasoning that play a central role in philosophy and in decision theory.
Thus, in addition to shedding light on the complexities of the moral domain, it arguably constitutes the most thorough challenge to the standard formal theory of practical rationality.
The present article will focus on the challenges Temkin raises against transitivity, since this principle plays a fundamental and pervasive role not only in decision theory, but also in philosophical arguments and in our ordinary, informal practical reasoning.
And yet, as Temkin has shown, these two deeply held beliefs are incompatible with Transitivity, in an argument that owes much to the Repugnant Conclusion.
According to Temkin's diagnosis of this paradox, FSV reflects the fact that sometimes we adopt an additive-aggregationist approach in evaluating and comparing different outcomes.
That is, we judge the relative goodness of two outcomes by comparing them in terms of both the quality and number of benefits or burdens and adding them up.
On the other hand, SSV reflects the fact that sometimes we adopt an anti-additive-aggregationist approach in evaluating and comparing different outcomes.
But many mildly unpleasant pop tunes spread out through time never amount to more than a nuisance; they simply do not add up in the way required to outweigh the tragic impact of two years of torture.
And yet, as Temkin has shown, these two assumptions about how to evaluate possible lives lead to intransitivities similar to those considered above.
Temkin has shown, however, that if the critics acknowledge this point about obligations, then it will be very difficult for them to maintain that the "better than" relation is transitive.
In order for this to create problems for the defender of transitivity, it need not be the case that, as Kant thought, the intrinsic moral worth of actions is more important than their consequences—it suffices that, when agents act rightly rather than wrongly, this fact has some intrinsic value, however small.
What these arguments show is that many of our deepest beliefs regarding how to assess the goodness of outcomes are fundamentally incompatible.
In light of these arguments, it appears that, if we are to achieve consistency in our normative beliefs, then very serious revisions are required in our understanding of the good and of practical reasoning.