Five days later, on November 14, Logan, on his own, filed a complaint with Illinois's Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC), alleging that he had been fired because of his physical disability in violation of state law.

"[13] The court also found unpersuasive arguments by the commission and Logan that, by submitting the completed questionnaire and attending the conference, Zimmerman had waived any standing to move to have the charge dismissed on grounds of failure to proceed in a timely fashion.

Canel agreed, telling Justice William Rehnquist that his client felt the same way at that point but had earlier followed the advice of previous counsel that had advised him to assert his rights under the law.

Specifically Stevens brought up Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,[19] where the statutory notice provisions related to the suit were held deficient enough to be a due process violation.

Mullane, where a requirement that publication in a newspaper was held a constitutionally inadequate level of notice to the beneficiaries of a common trust fund who stood to be deprived of their rights to hold the trustees and fiduciaries accountable for mismanagement through the settlement process, was the precedent that "affirmatively settled" the first question.

It would take a "remarkable reading" of the Court's precedent, Blackmun wrote, "to conclude that a horse trainer's license is a protected property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, while a state-created right to redress discrimination is not.

Justice Byron White had held there that constitutional due process guarantees are federal and "not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official action".

The Court had rejected all challenges to that law save the equal protection grounds, for the merits of a tenant's case against their landlord had no relation to their ability to afford the potentially exorbitant bond.

An employer facing a revived lawsuit argued the amended statute allowing it was a violation of the state constitution's guarantees of equal protection and due process, as well as its prohibition of laws benefiting a special interest without a rational justification.

A federal class action suit brought by 3,000 plaintiffs who met its conditions went back and forth between the district court and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals for the rest of the decade until Judge Brian Barnett Duff held in 1989 that the retroactive application of Logan the plaintiffs sought, while otherwise justifiable, would have led to an inequitable result for employers who, possibly lacking access to the evidence necessary to defend claims that were at that point well over a decade old, would effectively be forced to settle to their own financial detriment.

[53] Blackmun had rebuked Zimmerman for "miss[ing] the point" of Parratt with its attempts to distinguish the two cases, noting that what distinction there was—between the negligence of a government and its prescribed acts following its own procedures—actually weighed in Logan's favor.

Five months later Holman filed a pro se federal lawsuit under Section 1983, alleging that the law barring his suit violated the Fourteenth Amendment by denying him due process after a deprivation of property.

After briefly reviewing the facts, similar to the former, he noted the difference: New Jersey, unlike Nebraska, barred prisoners from suing under state tort law for the duration of their sentence.

He was doubtful that a single rule could give rise to the property interest that Logan had found derived from an entire procedure, and that even if it could be said to there was less risk of erroneous deprivation than under the FEPA's 120-day limit because federal judges have almost unlimited discretion in considering sentence reductions.

Lastly the federal government's bases for limiting the time 35(b) petitions could be filed was a finding that the Parole Commission was generally better suited to considering when prisoners could be released, which Becker found rational.

[63] In 1986 the Fourth Circuit split over whether Logan or Parratt controlled a case brought by a Fayetteville, North Carolina, couple who sought compensation from the city of Charlotte after it demolished a house they owned there without notifying them beforehand.

"[66] Ervin analogized the inverse condemnation process to the tort claim the Illinois Supreme Court had held an acceptable remedy for Logan—it would have been time-consuming, expensive and in the end could not have undone the original injury.

The Court of Special Appeals reversed in an unpublished opinion, finding that the two-year grace period established a property interest for the Pritchards which, per Logan, the state could not terminate without due process.

[80] Unlike Logan, whether a property owner satisfies the criterion by the time limit is a matter over which the property owner can exercise control, where, as here, there is no question as to the good faith of the administrative review ... Those who submit their site plans for review early in the two-year grace period enjoy a greater likelihood that the process will be completed and any approval granted than do those who delay until late in the process or who, as did the Pritchards, delay until the last moment.The Florida Supreme Court heard a case with similarities to Logan in 2000.

While the "for cause" standard he had invoked to hold Logan's claim a property interest worked within the opinion, "[it] does not give us any basis to disagree with the Illinois Supreme Court's conclusion that this entitlement had some serious 'holes' in it", Terrell commented.

[97] Thomas W. Merrill, Charles Evans Hughes Professor at Columbia Law School, looked back in 2000 and observed that, perhaps because Loudermill had explicitly rejected Arnett's "bitter with the sweet" formulation, the "analytically coherent solution to the positivist trap" that Logan had offered in conjunction with another minimally cited case from that era, Memphis Light, Power & Gas Division v. Craft[98][l] had been overlooked.

Justice Antonin Scalia's majority opinion rejected that argument, characterizing the bank's interest as "future business activity", which could not be considered property, unlike its intellectual-property claims, since it could not include the right to exclude.

[104] Scalia described this as "the hallmark of property", which to Merrill brought to mind the same phrase used by Blackmun in Logan—but with a different predicate: "an individual entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot be removed except 'for cause'".

"The failure to attend to Logan and the procedural due process case law points to what will surely be the most vexing problem created by College Savings Bank", Merrill wrote.

"Obviously, if a majority of the justices had followed [his] lead, Logan would not be among the cases meeting head-on the puzzle [of] whether the state must provide fair procedures for substantive entitlements it did not have to give in the first place", he wrote.

He suggested that, assuming the hypothesized goal of reducing the FEPC's caseload was the actual reason for the deadline, if perhaps it was understaffed and could not otherwise stay within its budget, "[t]his is an unfortunate state of affairs, but does it deny equal protection?"

"[115] The year after the decision, Illinois law professor Rodney Smolla devoted an extended analysis to Logan and its relationship with Parratt, in the context of what he saw as the Court's increasing emphasis on state tort remedies over Section 1983 actions as appropriate responses to alleged due process violations.

[s] "But the restriction of the access argument to due process in Logan, coupled with the Court's refusal to enunciate a doctrine tying any of the aforementioned strands into a coherent whole, will surely keep the civil litigant's status in limbo for the foreseeable future.

Blackmun's equal protection argument got some consideration in Rickett v. Jones, a 1990 Eleventh Circuit case, the petitioner prisoner alleged an equal-protection violation after his sentence was enhanced under Alabama's habitual-offender law while that of his codefendant in a failed escape attempt, which also should have been, was not due to prosecutors' failure to check the record.

Had there been evidence of the state's error being due to any factor greater than negligence, Johnson would have dissented; he advised Alabama's prosecutors to develop a more consistent system to perform criminal record checks lest future courts begin seeing more cases like Rickett's and considering the possibility that it had risen to the level of a constitutional violation.