He advised against a limited military reaction when Germany reoccupied the Rhineland in March 1936, calling for general mobilization or nothing.
[7] Maurin represented France in Poland at the tenth anniversary of Polish independence, and presented a Consular saber to Chief of State Józef Piłsudski.
[8] When General Marie-Eugène Debeney retired as Chief of Staff in 1928, Maurin and Maxime Weygand were proposed as replacements.
It was impossible to foretell with any accuracy in what direction the armed forces of Germany would move once the wall of paper was completely torn down.
[2] The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pierre-Étienne Flandin, wanted to obtain agreement from Britain for support in the event of a military confrontation with Germany, but Maurin refused to provide details of the action France proposed to take.
The British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, took the lack of firm commitments as evidence that France was looking for an excuse to avoid using force against Germany.
[12] When the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance was ratified in February 1936 Maurin told the Council of Ministers that the alliance would have no military value to France.
[15][a] He called for general mobilization of French forces, and said the government should considered declaring war, if possible with British support.
He asked Maurin to ensure that "in future political and military matters be submitted to the Haut Comité Militaire for discussion before being taken up by the Cabinet.
"[20] In 1936 Maurin supported General Gamelin and told the Cabinet it was inconceivable that France could reverse German remilitarization without full mobilization.
[21] Maurin despised General Charles de Gaulle, and in 1937 banished him to command of the 507th Tank Regiment.
"[23] However, during the crisis of the summer of 1938, when Adolf Hitler was threatening war with Czechoslovakia, Louis Maurin told Pierre Flandin that the French army was organized only for defense and could not undertake even a very limited military intervention.