Luftnachrichten Abteilung 350

The successes of Staffel and Gruppen working together with signals detachments in shooting down Allied aircraft to such an extent that Chi-Stelle became an esteemed agency whose intelligence was valued by the German Fighter Command.

The Luftwaffe at that time contained too many rough edges and contradictions, and despite all its supposed veneer of modernity, it was still burdened with too much inveterate Prussianism to be capable of instituting radical changes directly following great successes.

[12] Each intercept station and signal company analysed its allotted material that led to considerable duplication of effort and in light of the results obtained, a waste of personnel and equipment.

These companies were in agreement with Referat B regarding the fundamental aim of tactical and operational intelligence, specifically maintaining knowledge of the deployment and organisation of the Allied air forces.

The aircraft warning and plotting system developed in Meldeköpfe 1 was an exemplary one and following the creation of the Command Post for Radio Evaluation (German: Zentraler Gefechtsstand für Funkauswertung) (ZAF) was adopted by all Luftwaffe signals units.

Using a code word to drive a physical audio synchronisation protocol, any conversation taking place over normal Luftwaffe telephone circuits could be immediately terminated and the line used to quickly pass tactical reports e.g. air raid type and duration.

In autumn 1943 a large preconceived map exercise was performed from the operational staff of headquarters for the purpose of training the army in how to liaison with Luftwaffe signals to achieve the best results.

After the occupation of France, RAF Bomber Command refrained from switching on its Gee-H radio-navigation equipment until the aircraft had reached a longitude of 3° East, depriving signals of an advance warning of their arrival.

[56] The commanding general of Jagdkorps I, Generalleutnant Joachim-Friedrich Huth demanded that early warning of approaching enemy aircraft, particularly at night, should continue despite the loss of the French and Belgian sites.

As Allied air raids became more intense, from interwoven bomber streams covering Germany from the west and south simultaneously, it was impossible to handle the verbal announcements that were arriving into the operations room of the ZAF.

Due to the responsibility for logistics being passed from the Luftwaffe to the Reich Ministry of Armaments and War Production, by this point being directed by Albert Speer, the supply of materials to construct new stations proved extremely difficult, even as the demand for technical field equipment increased.

The activities of the diplomat Robert Daniel Murphy and his consuls in North Africa escaped German political notice as did the increased reconnaissance of the West African coast by Gibraltar-based aircraft.

[95] By identifying the traffic of the Allied air raid warning and radar organisations in Africa, the evaluation section was able to open a new field of intelligence, that greatly supplemented the results of air-to-ground monitoring.

The WT traffic of the Liberators, that was especially voluminous during the return flight, was DF'd during the whole raid, with the result that landings of individual aircraft in Turkey, Cyprus, The Levant and Malta could be precisely determined.

[118] After the Allies forced the withdrawn to Premstätten, the landline problem became acute for the signals battalion southeast, as the only lines of underground cable between Graz and Vienna were constantly being severed due to bombing attacks.

[125] In order to render this aid as reliable and comprehensive as possible, the 9th Company, LNR 32 with evaluators and intercept personnel was placed at the disposal of the 2nd Air Corps Command in Viterbo as an independent signals unit.

Finally, even the fighter Warning Service previously located in Perugia with the (F)122, the Luftwaffe long-range reconnaissance unit (German: Fernaufklärungsgruppe)[126][127] was transferred to Soriano, so that the 9th Company would also have available the results of RT operations by the two out-stations at Monte Cavo and Atri.

[129] After Italy's withdrawal from the war, any degree of security for the German position in the Balkans depended on the control of numerous islands around Greece, that in some cases, the Italian garrisons had immediately surrendered to the British.

Its women auxiliaries were interned in a camp near Bologna and the male personnel were taken to Naples under a misconception on the part of some RAF officers who had thought they had unearthed a spy ring.

There were some Soviet air armies, that owing to the incompetence or negligence of the signals officers, were looked upon with a sort of affection by the Chi-Stelle, while there were others whose traffic could only be analysed by bringing to bear all the resources that the Luftwaffe had available.

[146] In the autumn of 1940, the construction of a large Rhombic antenna system was started, and once in operation, was to orientated to the east and south-east, for the purposes of exploring the possibilities of a central high frequency intercept stations.

At the outbreak of World War II, the battalion was composed of:[149] In addition, the Fliegerkorps subordinated to Luftflotte 1 had a signals company that monitored Russian air activity that was of specific interest to the unit.

Nevertheless, there was much chaos and confusion manifested in the great number of plain text messages that were received, the state of readiness gradually improved, but lasted for several weeks, and can be attributed to the continuous withdrawal of the Russians.

Another company was created out of existing personnel, such that from August 1942 to December 1942, the battalion consisted of the following units:[151] A small intercept station in Mikkeli, with two out-stations, one in central Finland, the other on Lake Ladoga.

[151] During the period of transition, by augmenting its personnel in order to meet the increasing demands made upon it, the battalion was able to provide a flawless picture of the Soviet Air Force in the northern sector.

[152] In early 1941, owing to administration difficulties and problems with billets, part of the Luftflotte, including the operations office, and the signals battalion, moved from their location in Ostrov to Riga in Latvia.

Signals on several occasions were able to predict in advance the time and course of America heavy bomber formations flying over the Russian lines, and also at which fields these units would land, e.g.

This file contained all the information known of Soviet forces and included the number of their units, and their organisation, their record in the war to date, the location of airfields and other salient details, and names of important personalities.

Daily reports of this type indicating stocks of rations, ammunition and fuel, the condition of airfields, changes in personnel strength, were made by subordinate units to the senior HQ's.

[190] Even when call signs were changed daily, a Soviet unit was easily identified through this information as to members of aircraft and crews, and quantities of oil, fuel, ammunition, which were given in the clear.

Organization chart with a legend for Luftwaffe Signals Organization.
Fixed signals stations in the Reichswehr
Luftwaffe signals intelligence operations at the start of World War II
This diagram details the geographical layout of Luftwaffe signals intercept stations in the west of Europe during the middle of 1941.
Luftwaffe signals organisation in Norway in the middle of 1942
Luftwaffe signals organisation in west Europe, middle of 1940
Luftwaffe signals organisation in the west of Europe, in the middle of 1940. The whole system included had three W-Leit, five fixed signal intercept stations with five companies, totalling approximately 2000 men. Each station or W-Leit was capable of intercept Wireless Telegraphy (WT), Radiotelephone (RT) transmitting on the high frequency band
Luftwaffe signals organisation per unit chart in western Europe during the middle of 1941
This diagram details the geographical layout of Luftwaffe signals intercept stations in the west of Europe during the middle of 1941
Fig 9. This diagram details the geographical organisation of the Luftwaffe signals intelligence organisation in the west, during the middle of 1942. The area covered in Norway, France, the low countries and Belgium
Fig 10. This diagram details the geographical layout of Luftwaffe signals intercept stations in the west of Europe, in the middle of 1942. Each station location describes the types of signal that station can intercept. HF is high Frequency , VHF is very high frequency , WT is wireless telegraphy , RT is radiotelephone
Fig 11.Liaison channels for Luftwaffe signals staff in the west of Europe, during the middle of the year 1942
This diagram represents the organisational layout for Luftwaffe signal units prior to D-Day 1944.
Fig 13. The Geographical layout of the Luftwaffe signals intercept stations in the west of Europe, during 6 June 1944, D-Day
This diagram represents the geographical locations of a number of Direction-Finding (DF) base lines in west Europe, that were created by the Luftwaffe, and in place before D-Day. DF baselines are imaginary lines or axes in which DF equipment of a DF network is deployed in locations on that line. Luftwaffe Signals used straight DF lines. The length of the base line indicated the net location capability value in miles, in which a DF location can be made. For example, the distance from Husum, Germany to Brest, France is 716 miles, meaning that the net location capability is 716 miles in depth.
Fig 15. This diagram represents the organisation of a number of Luftwaffe Very High Frequency (VHF) Direction-Finding (DF) base lines that were created by the Luftwaffe, and in place before D-Day
Fig 16. Luftwaffe signals organisation in the west and within Germany, February 1945
Luftwaffe diagram of the operations room of the ZAF
Fig. 17 Liaison and channels of communication of Chi-Stelle in the west and Germany with Luftwaffe Staffs, German Army and Kriegsmarine.
This diagram represents the organisation of a number of Luftwaffe High Frequency (HF) Direction-Finding (DF) baselines that were created by the Luftwaffe, that was in place in the eastern Mediterranean, in mid-1942. The HF DF network enabled the Luftwaffe to track Allied bombing raids in the Balkans, e.g. the Allied Liberator bombing attack on Ploiești that was sent to destroy the oil installations and infrastructure a year later on 1 July 1943
This diagram represents the organisation of a number of Luftwaffe High Frequency (HF) Direction-Finding (DF) units of W-Leit 2, that were in place in the eastern Mediterranean, at the beginning of 1943. Note the large geographical distribution of the units, designed to give advanced warning of bomber attacks on Italy and Balkans
This diagram represents the organisation of a number of Luftwaffe Medium Frequency (MF) and High Frequency (HF) Direction-Finding (DF) baselines that were created by the Luftwaffe and placed in the eastern Mediterranean, in the autumn of 1943
The diagram represents an organisational withdrawal of Luftwaffe signals units in the Western Mediterranean, July 1943 to May 1945. After the fall of Africa, Luftwaffe signals units retreated as the Allies gained ground. The retreat started after Tunisia was captured by the Allies in May 1943, followed by Sicily in August 1943. The Luftwaffe removed critical DF, radar and intercept out-station equipment first from Tunisia to Frascati, and then from Frascati to Padua, as the war progressed. Frascati was the regional headquarters of Albert Kesselring before being moved to Padua and then Canazei. Equipment and personnel who could not be carried by aeroplane travelled up the west coast of Italy, to a troop assembly area at Cosenza , where they reorganised before heading north.
Luftwaffe organisation of High-Frequency DF baselines in the central Mediterranean area from May 1943 to September 1944. As the German Army conquered Italy, Sicily and Tunisia, Luftwaffe Signal Intelligence established DF baselines, radar intercept and radar jamming sites and signal intercept out-stations among the different locations in the central Mediterranean to detect Allied heavy-bomber movements. As the Allies pushed the Axis first out of Tunisia, and then Sicily, up the spine of Italy, the Luftwaffe progressively established new DF baselines as it withdrew. By late 1944, the Luftwaffe were pushed back into Germany.
Luftwaffe Italian organisation of Very High Frequency DF stations in the first half of 1944.
Luftwaffe Balkan organisation of Very High-Frequency DF stations in the first half of 1944.
The diagram represents the largest geographic expansion of the Luftwaffe W-Leit Southeast unit. The coloured areas indicate the areas of control for specific signals units.
Liaison and channel of communications of the Luftwaffe signals in the south, autumn of 1944. The diagram represents the flow of flash reports containing radio intelligence that are forwarded from the central organisation to the satellite unit who receive them. The star indicates that the unit has a liaison officer.
Luftwaffe telephone system for the Signals Regiment South (Ln 352) at the beginning of 1945
Luftwaffe Signal Intelligence radio networks in the south, at the beginning of 1945
The diagram represents the communication system for Luftwaffe Signals Regiment South. The regiment was controlled by Meldeköpfe Vienna, the central communication control station for the whole regiment. Each radar or intercept out-station would communicate with the Meldeköpfe either via direct telephone line by teleprinter when it was available, or by radio link when direct telephone lines were not available, usually later in the war.
Luftwaffe teletype network for the Signals Regiment South (Ln 352) at the beginning of 1945
Evolution of Luftwaffe east signals units from 1936 to 1940.
Evolution of Luftwaffe east signals units from 1941 to 1943.
Organisation of LN Abteilung 355, autumn 1944
Line of withdrawal of Luftwaffe signal units from the east to the west and back into Germany.
Soviet Grid System during World War II