Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, the rebuilt German Army was subject to severe limitations in size, structure and armament.
The German armed forces kept the name Reichswehr until Adolf Hitler's 1935 proclamation of the "restoration of military sovereignty", at which point it became part of the new Wehrmacht.
Heavy weapons above defined calibres, armoured vehicles, submarines and large warships were prohibited, as was any type of air force.
The Versailles Treaty fixed the term of service for Reichswehr officers at 25 years and for all others at 12 in order to prevent such a buildup of reservists.
The next day, German Chancellor Friedrich Ebert and General Wilhelm Groener, acting in the name of the Supreme Army Command, concluded the Ebert–Groener Pact.
In it Groener assured Ebert of the loyalty of the armed forces,[4][5] and in return Ebert promised that the government would take prompt action against leftist uprisings,[6] call a national assembly, keep the military command within the professional officer corps and, most importantly, retain the military's traditional status as 'state within a state' – that is, it would continue to be largely independent of the civilian government.
The withdrawal on the western front began on 12 November and by 17 January 1919 the areas on the west bank of the Rhine were free of German military forces.
"[9] A similarly worded law on the formation of a provisional navy dated 16 April 1919 authorised it to "secure the German coasts, enable safe maritime traffic by clearing mines, acting as maritime police and otherwise assisting merchant shipping, ensure the undisturbed exercise of fishing, enforce the orders of the Reich government in conjunction with the Reichswehr, and maintain peace and order.
[17] The 1921 Defence Law ended the military sovereignty of the states but left Saxony, Württemberg, Baden, and Bavaria with limited independence.
[31] The Reichswehr leadership considered them not only physically superior to young men from the cities but also as able to stand up against the "temptations" of social democracy.
In the crisis-ridden early 1920s, the Republic used the Reichswehr primarily to fight insurgent left-wing forces, such as during the Spartacist uprising in Berlin in 1919.
[38] Wherever the Treaty of Versailles tied the Reichswehr's hands or its own manpower was insufficient, it left 'national defence' – e.g. border skirmishes against Polish and Lithuanian irregulars,[39] or deployment in 1920 against the Ruhr uprising in the demilitarised Rhineland[40] – to the Freikorps, which continued to operate even though it had been officially disbanded in 1920.
[41] In 1923 General von Seeckt, who had the backing of Otto Gessler, organised "civilian work groups" called Arbeits-Kommandos (AKs) that were attached to Reichswehr units and received training and support from them.
[46] In March 1920, Germany's political leadership did not use the Reichswehr against the Kapp Putsch, a failed coup attempt against the Weimar Republic.
[47] The Reichswehr leadership began early on to circumvent the arms restrictions in the Versailles Treaty through a series of secret and illegal measures.
A secret Reichswehr aviation school and testing facility was established at Lipetsk, where some 120 military pilots, 100 aerial observers, and numerous ground personnel were trained as the core of a future German Air Force.
[55] In December 1926, Social Democrat Philipp Scheidemann disclosed the collaboration with the Soviet Union to the Reichstag,[56] toppling the government under Wilhelm Marx.
The government in Berlin responded by declaring a nationwide state of emergency, and President Ebert transferred executive power to Otto Gessler.
[60] When news of Adolf Hitler's Beer Hall Putsch reached Berlin on 8 November, Ebert transferred executive power from Gessler to Seeckt, even though there was no assurance that he would act in the interests of the Republic.
While war continued to be seen in the Reichswehr as a means to achieve political goals,[citation needed] government policy under the Locarno Treaties and the Dawes Plan, which for the short term resolved the issue of German reparations payments to the victorious powers, was oriented more toward maintaining peace and international understanding.
After the election of Paul von Hindenburg as Reich president in 1925, his status as victor in the 1914 Battle of Tannenberg made him a figure with whom Reichswehr soldiers identified.
In October 1926, without seeking government approval, Seeckt invited the son of former emperor Wilhelm II to attend army manoeuvres in the uniform of the old Imperial 1st Foot Guards.
[66] The decision to build the pocket battleship Deutschland in 1928, which was in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and seen as a matter of prestige, caused problems for the Social Democrat Reich Chancellor Hermann Müller because his party had campaigned against the ship, but his cabinet members voted for it in order to save the coalition government.
Franz von Papen and Kurt Schleicher, the two chancellors who followed Brüning, considered using the Reichswehr as part of their plans to abolish democracy.
Historian Klaus-Jürgen Müller sees in this one of the "lines of continuity" of German development from the Empire to National Socialism and the cause of an "entente" between the traditional military elites and the Hitler movement in 1933.
"[82] The outward situation changed in 1928 when the Reichswehr created the Ministeramt, or Office of Ministerial Affairs, under Kurt von Schleicher to lobby the government.
[77] When in 1923 Defence Minister Otto Gessler was given executive functions to deal with the nation's crises, the power went in essence to Seeckt.
He acted in the interests of Germany in preventing a possible civil war over the end of passive resistance to the occupation of the Ruhr and then during the communist threat of the German October in Saxony and Thuringia.
Its leader Ernst Röhm and his colleagues thought of their force as the future army of Germany, replacing the smaller Reichswehr and its professional officers.
In the Night of the Long Knives (30 June–2 July 1934) Röhm and the leadership of the SA were murdered along with many other political adversaries of the Nazis, including Reichswehr generals Schleicher and Ferdinand von Bredow.