[3] He is best known for his role as the commander of the Italian Second Army in its repression against civilians, in the Slovene- and Croatian-inhabited areas of Italian-occupied and annexed Yugoslavia during World War II.

[4] He constructed a policy in which he attempted to eliminate the Yugoslav Partisans, helped manage relations with the authorities of the puppet Independent State of Croatia, and "greatly advanced and systematized" collaboration with the Chetniks.

As a "manifesto for repression in the Yugoslav territories", Roatta issued Circular 3C which urged "ethnic clearance" be carried out and stressed the need for "complete cleansing" of Slovene-inhabited areas.

In line with Circular 3C's objectives Roatta ordered summary executions, hostage taking, reprisals, internments, burning of houses and whole villages, and the deportation of 25,000 people, who were placed in Italian concentration camps at Rab, Gonars, Monigo (Treviso), Renicci d'Anghiari, Chiesanuova and elsewhere.

During World War I he saw service on the Italian, Albanian and French fronts, serving for a period as chief of staff of a division of the II Corps.

In 1936 Ciano successfully persuaded Mussolini that Roatta be given command of the Corps of Volunteer Troops (Corpo Truppe Volontarie, CTV).

[8] In early March 1937, Roatta and his entire CTV were deployed to central Spain for the Battle of Guadalajara (Operation Folgore) with the intent of capturing Madrid and causing the collapse of the Second Spanish Republic.

Roatta reported that "all available forces in northern Italy gathered at the Yugoslav frontier between Tarvisio and Fiume: two armies on the front line, and a third in reserve.

[12] Between 30 January and 9 February 1942, Roatta discussed with Ambrosio to create a Policy Directive (Linea di condotta) on his command's relationship with the Croats, Chetniks, and Partisans.

Roatta was mostly concerned with removing a large number of Italian forces present in Zones II and III and reorganizing those left into strong garrisons to lower troop casualties.

Monsignor Joze Srebnic, Bishop of Veglia (Krk island), reported to Pope Pius XII that "witnesses, who took part in the burials, state unequivocally that the number of the dead totals at least 3,500".

[18] It was a "manifesto for repression in the Yugoslav territories" that urged mass internment and a scorched earth strategy in order for "de-Balkanization" and "ethnic clearance".

In "abnormal" (areas where military action was taking place) occupied districts, Roatta demanded that all families that, without good reason, lacked their able-bodied male members between the ages of sixteen and sixty years, be interned and deported.

[13]Roatta later explained his policy in more detail in his postwar memoirs: The political label of the "Chetniks," their indirect relations with the "Allies," and their program for the future did not interest this commander, and these things he "ignored."

Thus, despite the protests of Berlin and Zagreb, and the efforts of the government in Rome (which often changed its opinion and finally adopted the German view), we continued on our part to collaborate with the "Chetniks."

To implement this in Province of Ljubljana, Roatta suggested the closure of the Province of Fiume and Croatia, the evacuation of people in the east of the former frontiers to a distance of three to four kilometers inland, the organization of border patrols to kill anyone attempting to cross, the mass internment of "twenty to thirty thousand persons" to Italian concentration camps, burning down houses, and the confiscation of property from villagers suspected of having contact with Slovene Partisans for families of Italian soldiers.

Trifunović-Birčanin urged him to take action "as soon as possible" in a large operation against the Yugoslav Partisans in the Prozor-Livno area and offered aid in the form of 7,500 Chetniks on the condition that they be provided the necessary arms and supplies.

[27] Roatta objected to these "massive slaughters" of noncombatant civilians and threatened to halt Italian aid to the Chetniks if they did not end[26] and stated that "I request that Commander Trifunović be apprised that if the Chetnik violence against the Croatian and Muslim population is not immediately stopped, we will stop supplying food and daily wages to those formations whose members are perpetrators of the violence.

"[28] On 10 October 1942, Mladen Lorković, Croatian minister of foreign affairs, wrote a letter and memorandum concerning the increase in Chetnik anti-Croatian activity and terror that occurred between August and September, especially in Herzegovina, central Dalmatia, and Lika.

"[29] A few days later on 15 October, Roatta held talks with Pavelić in Zagreb and primarily discussed the Chetniks and the handover of Jews to German or Croatian authorities.

He used his new authority to assign both military and civilian resources to work constructing bunkers, installing anti-invasion obstacles on the most likely Allied landing beaches as well as laying barbed wire and mines.

Wary of how the Sicilians would react, given that relations between them and the mainland Italy were poor it was decided to remove Roatta, which was accomplished by moving him to Rome in June to replace General Vittorio Ambrosio as Chief of Staff of the Italian Army.

[43] The following day, a "mild mass meeting" took place at the Italian royal palace in protest of his escape and escalated into a riot ending with one person dead.