Military Revolution

The theory was introduced by Michael Roberts in the 1950s as he focused on Sweden (1560–1660) searching for major changes in the European way of war caused by the introduction of portable firearms.

Roberts linked military technology with larger historical consequences, arguing that innovations in tactics, drill and doctrine by the Dutch and Swedes (1560–1660), which maximized the utility of firearms, led to a need for more trained troops and thus for permanent forces (standing armies).

These changes in turn had major political consequences in the level of administrative support and the supply of money, men and provisions, producing new financial demands and the creation of new governmental institutions.

Noted military historians Michael Duffy and Jeremy Black strongly criticized the theory and have described it as misleading, exaggerated, and simplistic.

On 21 January of that year he delivered a lecture before the Queen's University of Belfast; later published as an article, "The Military Revolution, 1560–1660," that has fueled debate in historical circles for five decades, in which the concept has been continually redefined and challenged.

Though historians often challenge Roberts' theory, they usually agree with his basic proposal that European methods of warfare changed profoundly somewhere around or during the Early Modern Period.

[1] Roberts placed his military revolution around 1560–1660 as the period in which linear tactics were developed to take advantage of the increasingly effective gunpowder weapons;[6] however, that chronology has been challenged by many scholars.

In the Ottoman Empire, the emergence of an institutionally strong and internally cohesive army during the early stages of state formation—in the late fourteenth century—equipped the military with substantial bargaining powers.

"[13] Shallow formations are ideally suited for defensive deployments, but they are clumsy in offensive missions: the longer the frontage, the more difficult to maintain order and cohesion, or to perform any maneuver, especially wheeling.

Gustavus Adolphus understood well that far from being slow and ponderous, the assault columns like those used by Tilly were in fact faster and more flexible, and the Swedish King made use of them when required, like in the battle of Alte Veste (see picture 3).

In conjunction with less reliance on pistol fire it had the net effect of favouring shock action over firepower, contrary to the tendency defended by Roberts.

Jeremy Black pointed that it was the development of the State that allowed the growth in size of the armies, not the other way around, and found Parker guilty of "Technological Determinism".

But the military supremacy which the possession of a powerful siege train conferred contributed in no small degree to that strengthening of royal authority which we find in some European states in the later 15th century.

For example, Spain's army increased from mere tens of thousands in the late 15th century to 300,000 regulars and 500,000 militia (paper strength) by 1625 spread all throughout Europe, according to Philip IV.

Muster calls are the main source for the strength of armies before the 19th century, but by their own nature they lack continuity and are ill-suited for long time period analysis.

Even when presenting a balanced account, many historians did not possess military experience, thus they lacked the technical judgement to properly assess and critique their sources.

[52] The growth is however clear in the second half of the 17th century, when the States embrace the task of recruiting and arming themselves their armies, abandoning the system of commission, prevalent until the end of the Thirty Years' War.

The maximum size of field armies remained under 50,000 for most of this period, and strength reports over this figure are always from unreliable narrative sources and must be regarded with scepticism.

The most radical revisionist views of the theory consider it unable to explain the military developments of the Early Modern Period and the hegemonic rise of the West.

The new wave of revisionist historians reject completely the idea of a military revolution and base their position on close analysis of the gradual and uneven transformation of tactical, operational, and technological aspects of European warfare over the course of the late Middle Ages and Early Modern period, as well as in their assessment of similar military experiences among non-Western countries, namely, Japan, Korea, the Mughal Empire, and the Ottoman Empire.