Military history of the Philippines during the Marcos dictatorship

They sought help from Philippine Constabulary chief Fidel V. Ramos who joined them, and when they were cornered in Camps Aguinaldo and Crame on Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) from Roman Catholic Cardinal Jaime Sin.

[clarification needed] Sin called on private citizens, already planning protests connected to cheating during the elections, to help protect Enrile and Ramos' forces by forming a human barricade on the stretch of EDSA between the two camps.

[8] This had the effect of expanding the AFP's presence in the countryside, and also gave Marcos' central government the political benefit of weakening the influence of local politicians.

Marcos was alleged to have made a deal with smuggler-king Lino Bocalan to restrain the patrols of the Naval Operations Force (NOF) against Smuggling, which was under the command of Philippine Navy Commodore Ramon A.

[18] So when former MIM member Nur Misuari formed an armed secessionist group called the Moro National Liberation Front, he was quickly able to consolidate power.

[21] The NPA was finally able to regain weaponry on December 29, 1970, when Philippine Military Academy instructor Lt. Victor Corpus defected to the CPP-NPA and led a raid on the PMA armory, timing the raid when most cadets were out on Christmas vacation and the PMA's senior officers including its Superintendent, General Ugalde had left the camp to meet President Ferdinand Marcos upon his scheduled arrival in nearby Baguio.

[22] Corpus, who was PMA's designated officer of the day (OOD), guided the NPA raiding team which managed to escape with Browning Automatic Rifles, carbines, machineguns, and various other weapons and ammunition.

"[3][23] In 1971, AFP Chief of Staff Manuel T. Yan had prominently told media that the grounds for Marcos to either impose of martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus did not exist.

"[26] A week before Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos declare martial law in September 1972, copies of the plan for its implementation were distributed to key officials within the Armed Forces.

[3]: 32 Not long after the declaration of martial law, the Marcos-controlled press reported that Soliman had died of a heart attack, but it is believed that Marcos had ordered that he be killed.

[32] The military was given many functions aside from its task of national defense, including assisting in the implementation of price controls imposed on key products like corn and rice, enforcing the rules of the national corn procurement program, assisting in the collection of rural and government bank loans, implementing the agrarian reform law, and various police functions such as collecting unlicensed firearms and enforcing curfews, and suppressing strikes, rallies, and other demonstrations.

At the time, According to the US National Archives' copy of a Memorandum of Conversation between Nixon and US Ambassador to the Philippines Henry Byroade:[35] The president declared that we would "absolutely" back Marcos up, and "to the hilt" so long as what he was doing was to preserve the system against those who would destroy it in the name of liberty.

[44] Aside from human rights abuses, these units were also accused of hounding media entities,[45][46] corporate management,[47] and opposition groups[48] with threats, intimidation, and violence.

[53] However, the reports of Amnesty International, Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, the World Council of Churches, etc., all assert the fact that the torture happened as a policy of state, meant to stifle opposition, demonstrate the power of the ruling regime, and terrify the population into inaction.

Brigadier General Rafael Ileto (of PMA class 1943) vocally opposed Martial Law when it was still being planned, and was immediately sent away to an overseas diplomatic function as concurrent envoy to Iran and Turkey, and later Laos and Thailand.

[58] General Manuel Yan (of PMA class 1941) objected to Marcos' first act of suspending the writ of habeas corpus in 1971, famously told international media that the conditions for either "did not exist," and was compelled to retire early due to his lack of support for its declaration in 1972.

[3] During Martial Law itself, officers attempted to execute their duties while minimizing harm to the people, as was the case of Admiral Romulo Espaldon (also of USMMA Deck Class of 1950) who objected to the plans for the 1974 Siege of Jolo, and made sure that the Philippine Navy's ships were in place to rescue civilian evacuees once the attack on MNLF forces within the city did push through.

[62][63][64] Military Intelligence Service Lt. Col. Bonifacio Gillego spoke up against the Human rights abuses of the Marcos dictatorship, and was forced to flee into exile in the United States, where he committed himself to political organizing against the regime.

[26] The social unrest of 1969 to 1970, and the violent dispersal of the resulting "First Quarter Storm" protests were among the early watershed events in which large numbers of Filipino students of the 1970s were radicalized against the Marcos administration.

[72][73] The culpability of military forces involved in the Battle of Jolo, led by the 14th Infantry Battalion, has been the subject of controversy, worsened by the news blackout imposed by Marcos at the time.

[80] Generals loyal to Marcos were allowed to stay in their positions past their supposed retirement age, or were rewarded with civilian government posts.

[81] This led to a loss of morale among the middle-ranks of the AFP, because it meant a significant slowdown in promotions and caused many officers to retire with ranks much lower than they would otherwise have earned.

[83][84] The goal of the RAM coup d'état, planned by Colonels Gregorio Honasan and Red Kapunan, was to overthrow Marcos and turn power over to military junta which would include Enrile.

[88] However, even with their combined forces, Enrile and Ramos were cornered in Camps Aguinaldo and Crame on Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA).

[89][90][91] The Sotelo landing is recognized as the moment when Marcos lost control of the Philippine Air Force,[92] and also as a turning point in the People Power Revolution, because it encouraged even more AFP units to withdraw their support for the dictatorship.

[90] At dawn on the same day, AFP forces eventually managed to enter Camp Aguinaldo through the Logistics Command entrance on Santolan Road, coming in from their staging positions in Libis and dispersing the crowds around Gate 6 by using teargas.

[85] Recognizing the significance of the People Power Revolution, the US administration of Ronald Reagan eventually withdrew its support for Marcos and arranged for his exile to Hawaii.

Marcos fled Malacañang and stayed at Clark Airbase arguing with the Americans through the evening, finally agreeing to board a US Air Force flight to exile at around 5 AM on February 26, 1986.

[95] A number of notable officers disagreed with various decisions of Marcos and his top military appointees - some in the years before the declaration of Martial Law; some with regard to specific orders given during the authoritarian years of Martial Law and the Fourth Republic; some as part of the failed RAM coup of 1986; and many more in support of the civilian People Power Revolution which removed Marcos from power.

[105] Alongside capability development, "professionalization of all ranks" is one of two strategic priorities identified by the 15 year AFP Transformation Roadmap initiated during the Duterte administration.