Military science

[1] It is mainly focused on theory, method, and practice of producing military capability in a manner consistent with national defense policy.

[citation needed] The ability by the officers to make complex calculations required for the equally complex "evolutions" of the troop movements in linear warfare that increasingly dominated the Renaissance and later history, and the introduction of the gunpowder weapons into the equation of warfare only added to the veritable arcana of building fortifications as it seemed to the average individual.

Until the early 19th century, one observer, a British veteran of the Napoleonic Wars, Major John Mitchell, thought that it seemed nothing much had changed from the application of force on a battlefield since the days of the Greeks.

[2] Until this time, and even after the Franco-Prussian War, military science continued to be divided between the formal thinking of officers brought up in the "shadow" of the Napoleonic Wars and younger officers like Ardant du Picq who tended to view fighting performance as rooted in the individual's and group psychology[3] and suggested detailed analysis of this.

[4] The breakthrough of sorts made by Clausewitz in suggesting eight principles on which such methods can be based, in Europe, for the first time presented an opportunity to largely remove the element of chance and error from command decision making process.

[7] The military science on which the model of German combat operations was built for the First World War remained largely unaltered from the Napoleonic model, but took into the consideration the vast improvements in the firepower and the ability to conduct "great battles of annihilation" through rapid concentration of force, strategic mobility, and the maintenance of the strategic offensive[8] better known as the Cult of the offensive.

Their analysis of military history convinced them that decisive and aggressive strategic offensive was the only doctrine of victory, and feared that overemphasis of firepower, and the resultant dependence on entrenchment would make this all but impossible, and leading to the battlefield stagnant in advantages of the defensive position, destroying troop morale and willingness to fight.

[10] Because only the offensive could bring victory, lack of it, and not the firepower, was blamed for the defeat of the Imperial Russian Army in the Russo-Japanese War.

Force structuring is the method by which personnel and the weapons and equipment they use are organized and trained for military operations, including combat.

Force structure development is guided by doctrinal considerations of strategic, operational and tactical deployment and employment of formations and units to territories, areas and zones where they are expected to perform their missions and tasks.

Force structuring applies to all armed services, but not to their supporting organisations such as those used for defense science research activities.

The TOE is a document published by the U.S. Department of Defense which prescribes the organization, manning, and equipage of units from divisional size and down, but also including the headquarters of corps and armies.

Much of capability development depends on the concepts which guide use of the armed forces and their weapons and equipment, and the methods employed in any given theatre of war or combat environment.

Via the study of history, the military seeks to avoid past mistakes, and improve upon its current performance by instilling an ability in commanders to perceive historical parallels during battle, so as to capitalize on the lessons learned.

It studies the specifics of planning for, and engaging in combat, and attempts to reduce the many factors to a set of principles that govern all interactions of the field of battle.

Modern Western military art is composed primarily of an amalgam of French, German, British, and American systems.

Western military doctrine relies heavily on technology, the use of a well-trained and empowered NCO cadre, and superior information processing and dissemination to provide a level of battlefield awareness that opponents cannot match.

Soviet military doctrine (and its descendants, in CIS countries) relies heavily on masses of machinery and troops, a highly educated (albeit very small) officer corps, and pre-planned missions.

Russian Federation armed forces derive their principles of war predominantly from those developed during the existence of the Soviet Union.

The military principles of war of the People's Liberation Army were loosely based on those of the Soviet Union until the 1980s when a significant shift begun to be seen in a more regionally-aware, and geographically-specific strategic, operational and tactical thinking in all services.

As an example, the Soviet–Afghan War was predicated on the ability of the Soviet Union to not only successfully invade Afghanistan, but also to militarily and politically flank the Islamic Republic of Iran simultaneously.

How effectively and efficiently militaries accomplish their operations, missions and tasks is closely related not only to the methods they use, but the equipment and weapons they use.

Military intelligence serves to identify the threat, and provide information on understanding best methods and weapons to use in deterring or defeating it.

[13] This field of study can be linked to works by Clausewitz ("War is the continuation of politics by other means"[14]) and Sun Tzu ("If not in the interest of the state, do not act" [15]).

The contemporary multi and interdisciplinary field traces its origin to World War II and works by sociologists and political scientists.

[13] Studies show that enlistment motivation generally incorporates both self-interest (pay) and non-market values like adventure, patriotism, and comradeship.

The trauma of combat often results in post-traumatic stress disorder as well as painful physical health challenges[28] which often lead to homelessness, suicide, substance, and excessive alcohol use, and family dysfunction.

These men and women constitute a "reserve" force that countries rely on for their defense, disaster support, and some day-to-day operations etc.

[39] This metaphor captures "their structural duality" and suggests dynamic nature of reservist experience as they navigate commitments to their often conflicting civilian and military worlds.

[40][41] Given their greater likelihood of lengthy deployment, reservists face many of the same stresses as active duty but often with fewer support services.