In this context, the MTCR places particular focus on rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kilograms (1,100 lb) to a range of at least 300 kilometres (190 mi) and on equipment, software, and technology for such systems.
It includes a broad range of equipment and technology, both military and dual-use, that are relevant to missile development, production, and operation.
While still agreeing to exercise restraint, partners have greater flexibility in the treatment of Category II transfer applications.
[4] At the annual meeting in Oslo from 29 June to 2 July 1992, chaired by Sten Lundbo, it was agreed to expand the MTCR's scope to include nonproliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for weapons of mass destruction.
Some former Warsaw Pact countries, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, destroyed their ballistic missiles, in part, to better their chances of joining MTCR."
[6] China originally viewed the MTCR as a discriminatory measure by Western governments, which sold sophisticated military aircraft while restricting sales of competing ballistic missiles.
[7] It verbally agreed that it would adhere to the MTCR in November 1991, and included the assurance in a letter from its foreign minister in February 1992.
"[8][not specific enough to verify] The Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies Export Control List, a formal regulation, was issued in August 2002.
Countries which are not MTCR members buy and sell on the global arms market; North Korea is currently viewed as the primary source of ballistic-missile proliferation in the world, and China has supplied ballistic missiles and technology to Pakistan.
The code, which calls for restraint and care in the proliferation of ballistic missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, has 119 members.
[21][23][24] In 2020, the U.S. government announced that it would reinterpret its implementation of the MTCR to expedite sales of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to other countries.