Motivated reasoning
In addition, social context (groupthink, peer pressure) also partly controls the evidence utilised for motivated reasoning, particularly in dysfunctional societies.
[citation needed] Motivated reasoning differs from critical thinking, in which beliefs are assessed with a skeptical but open-minded attitude.
[5] Ziva Kunda reviewed research and developed a theoretical model to explain the mechanism by which motivated reasoning results in bias.
[1] Motivation to arrive at a desired conclusion provides a level of arousal, which acts as an initial trigger for the operation of cognitive processes.
Motivation then affects reasoning by influencing the knowledge structures (beliefs, memories, information) that are accessed and the cognitive processes used.
To summarize, the two models differ in that Kunda identifies a primary role for cognitive strategies such as memory processes, and the use of rules in determining biased information selection, whereas Lodge and Taber identify a primary role for affect in guiding cognitive processes and maintaining bias.
[11] Several works on accuracy-driven reasoning suggest that when people are motivated to be accurate, they expend more cognitive effort, attend to relevant information more carefully, and process it more deeply, often using more complex rules.
[9] Accuracy-oriented individuals who are thought to use "objective" processing can vary in information updating, depending on how much faith they place in a provided piece of evidence and inability to detect misinformation that can lead to beliefs that diverge from scientific consensus.
[11] Directional goals enhance the accessibility of knowledge structures (memories, beliefs, information) that are consistent with desired conclusions.
Michael Thaler of Princeton University, conducted a study[vague] that found that men are more likely than women to demonstrate performance-motivated reasoning due to a gender gap in beliefs about personal performance.
[18] Reviewing the debate, Stuart Vyse concluded that the answer to the question of whether U.S. liberals or conservatives are more biased is: "We don't know.
"[19] On April 22, 2011, The New York Times published a series of articles attempting to explain the Barack Obama citizenship conspiracy theories.
[20] Similarly, many people believe he is a Muslim (as was his father), despite ample lifetime evidence of his Christian beliefs and practice (as was true of his mother).
Liberals and progressives generally believe, based on extensive evidence, that human activity is the main driver of climate change.
By contrast, conservatives are generally much less likely to hold this belief, and a subset believes that there is no human involvement, and that the reported evidence is faulty (or even fraudulent).
A prominent explanation is political directional motivated reasoning, in that conservatives are more likely to reject new evidence that contradicts their long established beliefs.
[24] All ideas and opinions are shared and makes it very easy for motivated reasoning and biases to come through when searching for an answer or just facts on the internet or any news source.
In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, people who refuse to wear masks or get vaccinated may engage in motivated reasoning to justify their beliefs and actions.
[25] In a 2020 study, Van Bavel and colleagues explored the concept of motivated reasoning as a contributor to the spread of misinformation and resistance to public health measures during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Their results indicated that people often engage in motivated reasoning when processing information about the pandemic, interpreting it to confirm their pre-existing beliefs and values.
[26] The authors argue that addressing motivated reasoning is critical to promoting effective public health messaging and reducing the spread of misinformation.
In addition, they suggested using trusted sources to convey information by creating social norms that support public health behaviors.
[26] The outcomes of motivated reasoning derive from "a biased set of cognitive processes—that is, strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs.
"When the amount of incongruency is relatively small, the heightened negative affect does not necessarily override the motivation to maintain [belief].
"[This quote needs a citation] However, there is evidence of a theoretical "tipping point" where the amount of incongruent information that is received by the motivated reasoner can turn certainty into anxiety.
