[4] An emergency meeting of the main European powers–not including Czechoslovakia, although their representatives were present in the town, or the Soviet Union, an ally to both France and Czechoslovakia–took place in Munich, Germany, on 29–30 September 1938.

[15] Shortly after the Anschluss of Austria to Germany, Henlein met with Hitler in Berlin on 28 March 1938, and was instructed to make demands unacceptable to the democratic Czechoslovak government, led by President Edvard Beneš.

"[25] However, the Polish government indicated multiple times (in March 1936 and May, June and August 1938) that it was prepared to fight Germany if the French decided to help Czechoslovakia: "Beck's proposal to Bonnet, his statements to Ambassador Drexel Biddle, and the statement noted by Vansittart, show that the Polish foreign minister was, indeed, prepared to carry out a radical change of policy if the Western powers decided on war with Germany.

[24] General Alfred Jodl noted in his diary that the partial Czechoslovak mobilization of 21 May had led Hitler to issue a new order for Operation Green on 30 May and that it was accompanied by a covering letter from Wilhelm Keitel that stated that the plan must be implemented by 1 October at the very latest.

The British appointed Lord Runciman, a former Liberal cabinet minister, who arrived in Prague on 3 August with instructions to persuade Beneš to agree to a plan acceptable to the Sudeten Germans.

The Sudeten Germans were under instruction from Hitler to avoid a compromise,[29] and the SdP held demonstrations that provoked a police action in Ostrava on 7 September, in which two of their parliamentary deputies were arrested.

[31] Hitler accused the government of Czechoslovakia of being a client regime of France, claiming that the French Minister of Aviation Pierre Cot had said, "We need this state as a base from which to drop bombs with greater ease to destroy Germany's economy and its industry.

On 26 September, Chamberlain sent Sir Horace Wilson to carry a personal letter to Hitler declaring that the Allies wanted a peaceful resolution to the Sudeten crisis.

The agreement was officially introduced by Mussolini although in fact the Italian plan was nearly identical to the Godesberg proposal: the German army was to complete the occupation of the Sudetenland by 10 October, and an international commission would decide the future of other disputed areas.

On 30 September after some rest, Chamberlain went to Hitler's apartment in the Prinzregentenstraße and asked him to sign a statement calling the Anglo-German Naval Agreement "symbolic of the desire of our two countries never to go to war with one another again."

This was also reflected by the fact that especially the French government had expressed the view that Czechoslovakia would be considered as being responsible for any resulting European war should the Czechoslovak Republic defend herself with force against German incursions.

[54] The Nobel laureate, Thomas Mann, took to pen and pulpit in defense of his surrogate homeland proclaiming his pride at being a Czechoslovak citizen and praising the republic's achievements.

His replacement, General Franz Halder, sympathized with Beck and they were both recruited into Hans Oster's September Conspiracy which planned to arrest Hitler the moment he gave the invasion order.

He arrived by train in Neustadt (now Prudnik, Poland), a town right next to the former Czechoslovak border, and then travelled to Město Albrechtice, Krnov, Bruntál, and Zlaté Hory.

He told the British in a late April 1938 meeting that Hitler's real long-term aim was to secure "a domination of the Continent in comparison with which the ambitions of Napoleon were feeble."

[50] In the days following Munich, Chamberlain received more than 20,000 letters and telegrams of thanks, and gifts including 6000 assorted bulbs from grateful Dutch admirers and a cross from Pope Pius XI.

[73] The answer of Mościcki delivered on 27 September was evasive, but it was accompanied with the demand of Polish government to hand over two Trans-Olza counties immediately, as a prelude to ultimate settlement of the border dispute.

[74] Beneš's answer wasn't conclusive: he agreed to hand over the disputed territory to Poland but argued that it could not be done on the eve of the German invasion, because it would disrupt Czechoslovak preparations for war.

In his own words the conference was "an attempt by the directorate of great powers to impose binding decisions on other states (and Poland cannot agree on that, as it would then be reduced to a political object that others conduct at their will).

Stalin concluded that the West had colluded with Hitler to hand over a country in Central Europe to the Germans, causing concern that they might do the same to the Soviet Union in the future to allow its partition between the western nations.

The Australian Prime Minister Joseph Lyons said, "We owe heartfelt thanks to all responsible for the outcome, and appreciate very much the efforts of President Roosevelt and Signor Mussolini to bring about the Munich conference of the Powers at which a united desire for peace has been shown.

"[94] The American historian William L. Shirer, in his The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (1960), took the view that although Hitler was not bluffing about his intention to invade, Czechoslovakia could have offered significant resistance.

[115] Chamberlain felt betrayed by the Nazi seizure of Czechoslovakia, realized that his policy of appeasement towards Hitler had failed and so began to take a much harder line against Germany.

General Hans Oster, the deputy head of the Abwehr, and prominent figures within the German military opposed the regime for its behaviour, which threatened to bring Germany into a war that they believed it was not ready to fight.

'[121]Later that day he stood outside 10 Downing Street and again read from the document and concluded: My good friends, for the second time in our history a British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honour.

We are in the presence of a disaster of the first magnitude... we have sustained a defeat without a war, the consequences of which will travel far with us along our road... we have passed an awful milestone in our history, when the whole equilibrium of Europe has been deranged, and that the terrible words have for the time being been pronounced against the Western democracies: "Thou art weighed in the balance and found wanting."

The Prime Minister had already stated in a message broadcast to the Czecho-Slovak people on the 30th September, 1940, the attitude of His Majesty's Government in regard to the arrangements reached at Munich in 1938.

We consider your important note of the 5th August, 1942, as a highly significant act of justice towards Czecho-Slovakia, and we assure you of our real satisfaction and of our profound gratitude to your great country and nation.

[126] Following Allied victory and the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945, the Sudetenland was returned to Czechoslovakia, while the German speaking majority was expelled in accordance with the international Potsdam Agreement.

[130][131] In 1965, US President Lyndon Johnson, in justifying increased military action in Vietnam, stated, "We learned from Hitler and Munich that success only feeds the appetite for aggression.