After Musso and Alimin were released in 1923,[9] the former received an offer to teach Indonesian using English as the language of instruction in the Japan from van Hinloopen Labberton.

[2] However the Japanese government rejected Musso's explanation that he did not have a sufficient academic diploma, though McVey believes that the main reasons were his experience in prison and his political views.

[11] In January 1925, a committee of the Indies National Congress conducted a meeting resulting in the formation of the politically neutral, Surabaya-based Indonesian Study Club association.

[12] In early 1925, Musso and Alimin gave a speech at a rally organized by the VTSP[clarification needed] in Banten increasing communist influence in that region.

[15] He along with Budisutjitro and Sugono fled to Singapore meeting PKI agents Subakat and Alimin who had previously had stayed with Tan Malaka in Manila.

[16] The five, together with Sardjono, Mohammad Sanusi, and Winanta held discussions for three days before deciding to organize a revolt by the middle of 1926.

[21][22][23] The plan was if they could get support from the Comintern, they would instruct the PKI in the Dutch Indies to refrain from beginning a revolt until material aid arrived.

To prevent the revolt the plan as proposed by Musso and Alimin, the Comintern instructed them to stay in Moscow longer studying the Trotskyist deviation.

[25] In July 1928, Musso under the name Manavar, along with Alimin, Semaoen, Darsono, and Tadjudin, attended the Sixth Congress of Comintern led by Stalin.

[19] He explained the Dimitrov line, a new communist tactical approach, in several newspapers, including three times in Indonesia Berdjoeang.

[29] Focusing in Surabaya and Solo, in this consolidation, Musso managed to persuade Pamudji, Azis, Sukajat, Djokosoedjono, Amir Sjarifudin, and Tan Ling Djie to join the PKI.

[19] In an article published in Bintang Merah stated that Musso went to Prague in early November 1947 helping Soeripno, that represented Indonesia in discussions about a consular agreement with the USSR.

[31] In January 1948 after the signing of the Renville Agreement, Musso defended his comrades in Indonesia from criticism by Moscow, especially Amir Sjarifudin, stating that it was "just a tactic, in order not to the draw attention of the anti-communist faction.

They stopped in New Delhi and stayed for two or three weeks waiting for the Indonesian Air Force to finish arranging the acquisition of an aircraft.

[31] Musso planned a communist revolution, consistent with Soviet policy, named A New Road for the Indonesian Republic either in Prague or on the way home.

[34] While in Prague, Musso discussed with Dutch-Indonesian relations Soeripno and Paul de Groot, a Dutch communist, and also whether Indonesia was to become a Netherlands commonwealth or fully independent.

[40][41] On 12 August, Merdeka, a newspaper based in Solo, wrote that "there was a possibility that Musso, a veteran leader who was very popular, had returned".

[47] On 28 August, Musso discussed with Ibnu Parna from the Gerakan Revolusi Rakjat (GRR) and Akoma leaders the possibility of both organizations merging with the PKI.

Starting on 7 September, Musso, Wikana, Setiadjit, and Amir Sjarifudin held mass meetings in Central and East Java, beginning in Solo, Madiun the day after, Kediri on the 11th, Jombang and Bojonegoro on the 13th and 14th, and Cepu and Purwodadi on the 16th and 17th.

Ricklefs, Musso had no experience in Indonesia so he had no base of political power over the majority of Indonesian people compared to Sukarno.

[52] Responding to this, Musso formed the Nasional Daerah Madiun Front, and appointed Soemarsono as military governor and Djoko Soedjono as militia commander.

[52] Musso and Amir who knew that they could not successfully resist a Subroto-led attack, instructed the PKI force to try to escape and hide in the mountains.