NLF and PAVN logistics and equipment

The infamous punji sticks soaked in excrement and urine received much press, but they were of negligible effect compared to the massive quantity of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines deployed by main communist units.

Thousands of Chinese troops (the PLA's 1st and 2nd Divisions) made important contributions to Hanoi's war effort- building or repairing hundreds of miles of track and numerous other facilities such as bridges, tunnels, stations and marshaling yards.

As the war progressed, the North Vietnamese expanded and improved the Trail, moving material by truck, installing missile batteries for air defense and laying fuel pipelines.

[13] The Trail had over 20 major way-stations operated by dedicated logistics units or Binh Trams, responsible for air and land defence, and delivery of supplies and replacements to fighting points in the South.

[15] ... military supplies were sailed directly from North Vietnam on communist-flagged (especially of the Eastern bloc) ships to the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville, where that nation's neutrality guaranteed their delivery.

It was never a question of victory for the North, it was only a matter of time.By 1969 the Ho Chi Minh Trail was a sophisticated logistical web with paved roads, truck parks, maintenance and supply depots, and well organized and defended terminuses and bases, moving thousands of men per month into the battle zone.

[17] The need for massive amounts of manual labor for construction actually decreased on the Trail as heavy equipment like bulldozers and rock crushers were deployed, and both miles of road built and truck traffic expanded.

Big search and destroy operations seized hundreds of tons of rice and other material in remoter base areas, but these could be regenerated and restocked again when roving US troops invariably moved on to their next sweep.

The Ho Chi Minh Trail consumed massive amounts of attention, but the internal pipelines were also crucial, and these were not closed off because the US and particularly the South Vietnamese Government failed to control the major population concentrations effectively.

[21] Civilian labor was crucial to VC/PAVN success, and was deployed in building fortifications, transporting supplies and equipment, prepositioning material in readiness for an operation, and general construction such as road repair.

Civilians undertook various pledges as directed by the regime (the "three readies", the "three responsibilities" among others,) as part of a high mobilization of the population for total war in the North and areas controlled by the VC/PAVN in the South.

[22] Load bearing by porters was greatly enhanced by the use of ingenious "steel horses" – bicycles specially modified by widening the handlebars, strengthening the suspensions and adding cargo pallets.

[24] Communist forces also made extensive use of Vietnam's large network of rivers and waterways, drawing heavily on the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville, which was also off-limits to American attack.

Until late in the War, American pilots, hindered by their government's rules of engagement, could only watch helplessly as munitions, heavy weapons and advanced components like SAM missile batteries were unloaded at such harbors as Haiphong.

VC fighters in some areas ironically treasured the American M16 rifle despite its sometimes quirky performance, for the wide availability of both the weapon and its ammunition on the black market or through purchase from corrupt ARVN soldiers, or through the careless handling and loss of magazines by US troops.

[22] As one of the world's foremost military powers, the US could bring a massive variety of sophisticated aerial technology to bear on the communist side, ranging from heavy B-52 bombers, to carrier-based striking forces, to precision munitions.

As one historian notes "Knowing that the Vietnamese could replace their losses indefinitely, and were doing so, the American war planners counted on the psychological wear and tear of modern air-power upon a land-bound adversary.

Rolling Thunder imposed several limitations on US operations, and allowed Soviet and Chinese ships freedom to continuously deliver munitions and supplies into the battle zone.

These attacks removed many of the restrictions upon previous American targeting, seeded Northern waters with mines that cut Soviet and Chinese imports to a trickle, exhausted national air-defenses and crippled whatever significant remaining industrial plant and transportation network was left in the North.

For example, US F-4 aircraft destroyed power generators at the Lang Chi Hydroelectric Plant during Linebacker I, but left its dam 50 feet (15 m) away untouched to minimize civilian collateral damage.

Over 150,000 Northern soldiers however remained in the South after the 1972 Offensive, expanding the conquered zone, building up logistics capacity (including the construction and extension of pipelines) and biding their time, until the final Ho Chi Minh Campaign in 1975.

[3] Northern leader Le Duan chose to defy US airpower, arguing that though Hanoi, Haiphong or other cities were destroyed, the Vietnamese people would not be intimidated, and called for a massive war mobilization of reserves.

Joined by assorted militia and self-defense forces, these quick-reaction units were often stationed along heavily bombed routes and deployed to repair bridges, roads, tracks, tunnels and other structures.

A female fighter, Ngo Thi Tuyen', was hailed as a model of patriotic resistance and devotion for heroic repair efforts to the important Thanh Hóa Bridge, a structure that stood up against several attempts to destroy it, until laser-guided bombs knocked it down in 1972.

One historian asserts: By 1975, the emergency troops had shepherded war material south and an estimated 700,000 wounded soldiers back to North Vietnam, while helping air defenders bring down some 8,558 U.S. aircraft lost in Southeast Asia.

North Vietnam was allowed almost four months to complete preparations and 13 days after an 11 July press conference in which a US spokesman said there were "no plans at this time" to attack the missile threat, Hanoi's SAM batteries downed an Air Force F-4C Phantom and its 2-man crew- one survivor spending eight years in a POW camp.

Subsequent US analysis indicated skillful movement and dispersal by the North Vietnamese, with one of the missile sites a decoy, and another left empty – deployed as bait to lure the American pilots to their doom.

The method also spread out available cargoes over time and space, enabling the entire network to better bear losses from such deadly enemies as the American C-130 Gunship, and such technologies as movement sensors.

Truck lights were dimmed or mounted under vehicles, and at regular intervals on some routes, spaces were cut into the jungle trees, forming small cups into which kerosene or some other flammable liquid was poured.

Local tribesmen recruited by PAVN for example would beat on pots or gongs to warn of the presence or landing of US Special Operations teams and high rewards were offered for assisting with their capture.